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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis deals with modality and modal verbs, and especially with modality in 
academic writing. The goals of this dissertation are: to provide an overview of modality 
and modal auxiliaries (chapter 1); to focus on modality in academic writing and, in 
particular, on the concepts of hedges and boosters (i.e. two categories of epistemic 
modality, chapter 2); finally, to investigate how hedges and boosters are used by non-
native speakers (NNS) of English and to compare this use with that of expert writers. 
As mentioned above, chapter 1 deals with modality and modal auxiliaries. 
More specifically, first of all the basic concepts related to modality, such as the notion 
of assertion, of proposition, proposal, polarity, mood and modal systems are introduced; 
then, the classification of modality in modal systems according to scholars such as 
Palmer (2001) is provided. This author, indeed, classifies modality into two types: 
propositional modality and event modality. Each can be subdivided into two further 
categories: epistemic and evidential for propositional modality; deontic and dynamic for 
event modality (and, as we will see later in chapter 1, further subcategories are present). 
Palmer (2001) also focuses on other types of modality, of which the most important 
one, namely the past tense as a modal, is described. 
This classification of modality is compared to that proposed by Coates (1983), 
who distinguishes between epistemic and non-epistemic (also called “root”) modality. 
The two concepts are accounted for, together with the properties of modal auxiliaries. 
Moreover, the concepts of “core”, “periphery”, “skirt”, “gradience”, “ambiguity” and 
“merger”, which once again are explained by Coates (1983), are introduced. Finally, the 
chapter ends with a focus on the most important modal auxiliaries, subdivided into 
categories according to their function: the modals of obligation (must, need, should and 
ought); the modals of ability and possibility (can and could); the modals of epistemic 
possibility (may, might and epistemic could); the modals of volition and prediction (will 
and shall), and finally the hypothetical modals (would, should and hypothetical 
meaning). 
Chapter 2 deals specifically with modality in academic writing. In the very first 
section of this chapter I investigate modality in native speakers‟ (NS) academic writing, 
in order to see which choices expert writers make and why; in the second and third 
section I provide definitions of what hedges and boosters are. These two concepts are 
related to epistemic modality and central to academic writing. Indeed, to sum up, hedges 
are used when authors need to express indeterminacy, to make sentences more 
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acceptable to the reader and thus increase their possibility of ratification, whereas 
boosters, as Hyland (1998) states, “allow writers to express conviction and assert a 
proposition with confidence, representing a strong claim about a state of affairs” 
(Hyland 1998:2). After this explanation, I provide a literature review of the most recent 
and less recent articles related to hedges and boosters in NS academic writing and 
corpora, and in learners‟ academic writing. 
Chapter 3 is the core of the thesis; it compares two corpora, namely a corpus of 
136 essays written by NNS of English and a corpus of 20 academic writing written by 
expert writers of English, in order to see how hedges and boosters are used by NNS of 
English and by expert writers. More specifically, I aim at answering the following 
research questions: 1a+1b) Do ESL learners (in our case, Italian students of English) 
use more hedges or boosters in academic writing? And compared to expert writers of 
English?; 2a+2b+2c+2d) What are the five most commonly used hedges in academic 
writing by these students? What are the five most commonly used boosters in academic 
writing by these students? What are the five most commonly used hedges in academic 
writing by expert writers? What are the five most commonly used boosters in academic 
writing by expert writers?; and 3a+3b) As Hyland and Milton (1997) argue, are the 
expressions of doubt and certainty (i.e. hedges and boosters, respectively) difficult to 
master for non-native speakers of English (in our case, for Italian students of English)? 
And if so, is this a culture-related phenomenon? 
Before answering the above questions, I provide some information related to 
the materials and methods used for my investigation (e.g. the use of the AntConc 
software); then, I not only present the results of my investigation, but I also provide a 
more qualitative analysis by looking in greater detail at how one hedge and one booster, 
namely the commonly found in the NNS corpus hedge according to and the commonly 
found in the expert writers‟ corpus booster clearly, respectively, are used in the two 
corpora (also, definitions of these two epistemic devices are provided), and by looking 
at the common patterns of two hedges, namely could and should, in both the NNS 
corpus and in the expert writers‟ corpus and by comparing their use. The chapter ends 
with a comparison of the findings with those of chapter 2, and with the possible 
implications for teaching academic writing related to hedges and boosters. This thesis 
concludes with a conclusive chapter that summarizes the discussion, re-states the thesis 
purpose and provides implication for research or practice. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION TO MODALITY 
 
As this thesis deals with modality and modal verbs, I will first introduce some concepts 
related to modality: that of modality itself; the distinction between realis and irrealis and 
the notion of assertion. 
 
1.1 Basic concepts about modality 
 
As regards modality, Palmer (2001) explains that this is a category which is closely 
associated with tense and aspect because all three are categories of the clause and are 
generally marked within the verbal complex. He further argues that one possible 
approach to the analysis of the status of the proposition is to make a binary distinction 
between “non-modal” and “modal” or “declarative” and “non-declarative”, and to 
associate this distinction with the notional contrast of  “factual” and “non-factual”, or 
“real” and “unreal”. However – the author continues – in recent years the terms “realis” 
and “irrealis” have been used for this distinction: the realis portrays situations as 
actualized, while the irrealis portrays them as within the realm of thought. Moreover, 
Palmer (2001) explains that there is variation in the categories that are treated as “realis‟ 
and “irrealis” in different languages: one language may mark, for instance, commands 
as irrealis, while another may mark them as realis, and yet another may not treat them as 
part of a system of modality at all. 
As regards the notion of assertion, Palmer (2001) believes that the contrast 
between “factual” and “non-factual” is not clear enough to explain fully the distinction 
between “realis” and “irrealis”. He refers to the literature and points out that here it has 
been argued that the use of the “indicative” and the “subjunctive” (i.e. the traditional 
terms used in many European languages for the distinction realis/irrealis) can be 
accounted for in terms of “assertion” and “non-assertion”. The author refers to Lunn 
(1995, in Palmer 2001), who links the choice of the indicative to assertion and that of 
subjunctive to non-assertion. Lunn (1995, in Palmer 2001) suggests that a proposition 
may be unworthy of assertion for three reasons: the speaker has doubts about its 
veracity; the proposition is unrealized; the proposition is presupposed. According to 
Palmer (2001), her analysis shows quite clearly that the choice of the irrealis marker, the 
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subjunctive, does not depend on the distinction “factual”/“non-factual” (or 
“true”/“untrue”) but on the distinction between what is asserted and what is not asserted. 
Compared to Palmer (2001), Huddleston (1988) also discusses modality in 
relation to time and tense. He states that there are just two tenses in English, past and 
present, because there is no verbal category in English whose primary use is to locate 
situations in future time, although future time is very often indicated by will. 
Huddleston (1988) argues that, from a semantic point of view, will involves elements of 
both futurity and modality. He says that in an example such as she will be in London 
now, the modal component is more salient because this is less assured than she is in 
London now, whereas in she will be in London next week the futurity component is 
more salient. 
In order to further clarify the definition of modality given both by Eggins 
(2004) and by Halliday (2004), I need to introduce the notions of proposition, proposal 
and polarity. Halliday (2004) states that when language is used to exchange information, 
the clause takes the form of a proposition. The term proposition is used by Halliday 
(2004) to refer to a statement or a question, whereas in order to refer to offers and 
commands (i.e. in an exchange of goods and services) he uses the term proposal. The 
same terms are used by Eggins (2004,) who specifies that, in the exchange of 
information (i.e. with propositions), the response to an initiating move is nearly always 
verbal, whereas with proposals the responding moves may very often be non-verbal. 
Polarity is defined by Halliday (2004) as the opposition between positive (e.g. 
It is. Do that!) and negative (e.g. It isn‟t. Don‟t do that!), modality as the speaker‟s 
judgment, or request of the judgment of the listener, on the status of what is being said 
(e.g. It could be. Couldn‟t it be?). So polarity is a choice between “yes” and “no”, but, 
as both Halliday (2004) and Eggins (2004) point out, there are intermediate degrees, and 
these are known collectively as modality. In a proposition there are two kinds of 
intermediate possibilities: a) degrees of probability: possibly/probably/certainly and b) 
degrees of usuality: sometimes/usually/always. Halliday (2004) refers to the scales of 
probability and usuality as modalization. 
As concerns proposals, here again we have two kinds of intermediate 
possibilities: a) in a command, the intermediate points represents degrees of obligation: 
allowed to/supposed to/required to, b) in an offer, they represent degrees of inclination: 
willing to/anxious to/determined to. 
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1.2  Mood and modal systems 
 
Now that I have introduced these basic concepts, I can move on to see in which ways 
languages deal with modality. There are indeed two ways in which languages deal 
grammatically with the overall category of modality: mood and modal systems. I will 
first give here the definition of mood. Leech (2006) gives the following definition: 
 
 [Mood is a] verb category which is not so useful in the grammar of English as it is for some 
other languages and has to do with the degree of reality attributed to the happening described by the 
verb. The indicative mood (that of normal finite forms of the verb) contrasts with the 'unreality' of 
the subjunctive mood. The imperative, infinitive and interrogative are also sometimes considered to 
be moods of the verb (Leech 2006:65). 
 
 Returning to Palmer (2001), he points out that both systems (i.e. mood and 
modal systems) may occur within a single language (e.g. German has a modal system of 
modal verbs and mood), but that in most languages one of these devices is much more 
salient than the other (e.g. in English the subjunctive has virtually disappeared and, at 
the same time, a modal system of modal verbs has been created). As regards mood, 
Palmer (2001) explains that typically with mood, all or most clauses are either realis or 
irrealis, so that the system is prototypically binary (e.g. in European languages the 
indicative marks clauses as realis, and the subjunctive marks them as irrealis), although 
with some exceptions. Within modal systems – Palmer (2001) continues – different 
kinds of modality are distinguished. A clear example is that of the English modal verbs 
when they are used to make judgments about the status of a proposition as in: Kate may 
be at home now (i.e. a possible conclusion= speculative);  Kate must be at home now 
(i.e. the only possible conclusion= deductive) and Kate will be at home now ( i.e. a 
reasonable conclusion= assumptive). Finally, the author remarks that it is not always 
possible to draw a clear distinction between mood and modal system, since, in some 
languages, the overall system of modality has characteristics of both. 
As concerns mood once again, both Halliday (2004) and Eggins (2004) focus 
on a different kind of Mood (with a capital letter, to distinguish it from the mood we 
have seen so far), namely the Mood structure of the clause. Eggins (2004) explains that 
“the Mood structure of the clause refers to the organization of a set of functional 
constituents including the constituent Subject” (Eggins 2004: 147), whereas Halliday 
(2004) states that “The Mood is the element that realizes the selection of mood in the 
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clause” (Halliday 2004: 113). Eggins (2004) provides a table with the speech functions 
and relative typical mood (in this case, “our” mood) of clause (Eggins 2004: 147). She 
explains that a statement typically has declarative mood, a question has interrogative 
mood, a command has imperative mood, an offer has modulated interrogative mood (i.e. 
a would like interrogative, e.g. would you like to borrow my copy?), both answer and 
acknowledgment has elliptical declarative mood (i.e. an abbreviated 
answer/acknowledgment such as Yes, I have instead of Yes, I have read it or Yea instead 
of Yea I know it‟s by Henry James), and finally both accept and compliance have a 
minor clause (i.e. a clause which has never a Mood constituent, such as Oh dear!, Well!, 
Ok!).  
 
1.3 The classification of modality in modal systems according to Palmer (2001): propositional 
and event modality 
 
I will now take a look at how Palmer (2001) classifies modality in modal systems. He 
argues that there are two types of modality: propositional modality and event modality. 
Each can be subdivided into two further categories: epistemic and evidential for 
propositional modality; deontic and dynamic for event modality. Epistemic and 
evidential modality (i.e. propositional modality) are concerned with the speaker‟s 
attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition, whereas deontic and 
dynamic modality (i.e. event modality) refer to events that have not taken place but are 
merely potential. The examples given by Palmer (2001) for propositional modality are 
the following: Kate may be at home now and Kate must be at home now (both 
epistemic, they are concerned with the speaker‟s judgment of the proposition that Kate 
is at home); those given about event modality are Kate may come in now and Kate must 
come in now (both deontic, they are concerned with the speaker‟s attitude towards a 
potential future event, that of Kate coming in). 
On the other hand, Huddleston (1988) groups the uses of the modals under 
three headings: epistemic uses, deontic uses and subject-oriented uses. Here I will just 
focus on subject-oriented uses. The examples given by Huddleston (1988) are Liz can 
run faster than her brother and Liz wouldn‟t lend me the money [so I borrowed it from 
Ed]. He argues that these are “subject-oriented uses” in that they involve some property, 
disposition or the like on the part of whoever/whatever is referred to by the subject (i.e. 
in the first example we are concerned with Liz‟s physical capabilities, in the second 
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with her willingness). Finally, Huddleston (1988) points out that all the examples given 
(also the ones I have not reported for the other categories) are intended just as 
prototypical illustrations of the categories of use. 
Finally, as concerns the classification of modality once again, Biber et al. 
(1999) state that modals and semi-modals can be grouped into three major categories 
according to their main meanings. These groups are: permission/possibility/ability: can, 
could, may and might; obligation/necessity:  must, should, (had) better, have (got) to, 
need to, ought to and be supposed to, and volition/prediction: will, would, shall, be 
going to. Biber et al. (1999) also argue that each modal can have two different types of 
meaning, which can be labeled intrinsic and extrinsic (also referred to as deontic and 
epistemic meanings). As they state: 
 
 Intrinsic modality refers to actions and events that humans (or other agents) directly 
control: meanings relating to permission, obligation, or volition (or intention). Extrinsic modality 
refers to the logical status of events or states, usually relating to assessment or likelihood: 
possibility, necessity, or prediction (Biber et al. 1999: 485).  
 
1.3.1 Propositional modality: epistemic (speculative, deductive, assumptive) vs. 
evidential modality (reported, sensory, direct and indirect evidence) 
 
We have just seen that propositional modality can be of two types: epistemic or 
evidential. As regards epistemic modality, Palmer (2001) explains that there are three 
types of judgment that are common in languages: one that expresses uncertainty, one 
that indicates an inference from observable evidence, and one that indicates inference 
from what is generally known. These may be identified typologically as speculative, 
deductive and assumptive, respectively (see also examples in 1.2).  
As regards evidential modality, the author argues that there are basically only 
two types of purely evidential categories, that is reported and sensory (evidence of the 
senses). Sensory is related to languages other than English, such as Tuyuca (Brazil and 
Colombia) where there are evidential categories labeled “visual”, “non-visual”, 
“apparent”, “second-hand” and “assumed”. As regards reported (i.e. the other type of 
evidential category), for some languages – Palmer (2001) explains – it is necessary to 
recognize three subcategories: second-hand evidence: the speaker claims to have heard 
of the situation described from someone who was a direct witness; third-hand evidence: 
the speaker claims to have heard of the situation described, but not from a direct 
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witness, and evidence from folklore: the speaker claims that the situation described is 
part of established oral history. Finally, for some languages we have direct and indirect 
evidence. 
  
1.3.2  Event modality: deontic (directives and commissives) vs. dynamic (ability and 
willingness) 
 
As mentioned above, event modality can be of two types: deontic and dynamic. Deontic 
modality, according to Palmer (2001), relates to obligation or permission emanating 
from an external source, while dynamic modality relates to ability or willingness which 
comes from the individual concerned. The most common types of deontic modality are 
the “directives”, that is “where we try to get others to do things” (Searle 1983: 166, in 
Palmer 2001). Two kinds of directives are expressed in English by may and must, 
though in colloquial speech can is preferred to may. The examples given are: You 
may/can go now (permissive) and You must go now (obligative).  
Apart from directives, we have commissives, “where we commit ourselves to 
do things” (Searle 1983: 166, in Palmer 2001). They are signaled in English by the 
modal verb shall. They can be usually seen either as promises or threats, depending on 
whether what the speaker undertakes to do is or is not welcome to the addressee. The 
examples given by Palmer (2001) are: John shall have the book tomorrow (promise) 
and You shall do as you are told (threat). Palmer (2001) explains that, in both examples, 
the speaker commits himself to ensuring that the event takes place. 
After this explanation, Palmer (2001) points out that there appear to be two 
types of dynamic modality, expressing ability and willingness (Abilitive and Volitive), 
which are expressed in English by can and will. The examples offered are: My destiny‟s 
in my control. I can make or break my life myself (Abilitive) and Why don‟t you go and 
see if Martin will let you stay? (Volitive). Furthermore, he explains that, in many 
languages, there is no formal distinction between permission and ability, but in English 
the distinction is clear, in that may is not used to indicate ability.  
As regards directives and commissives, Carter and McCarthy (2006) point out 
that “when modality expressions concerned with necessity, obligation, permission etc. 
are used in declarative and interrogative clauses, they often function as directives […] 
and commissives[…]” (Carter and McCarthy 2006: 684). They explain that directives 
include: commands and instructions; warnings, advice and suggestions; permissions and 
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prohibitions and  requests. Commissives instead include: offers, invitations and 
promises, and undertakings.  
There are other classifications of modality as well: that by Hengeveld (2004) 
and that by van der Auwera and Plungian (1998). As pointed out by Nauze (2008) (i.e. 
the author of the dissertation I am referring to for the classification proposed by 
Hengeveld, van der Auwera and Plungian), Hengeveld (2004, in Nauze 2008) proposes 
a typology of modality that reflects the different layers of the clause structure in the 
functional grammar tradition (i.e. predication, event or proposition). He uses two 
classifying parameters: the target of evaluation and the domain of evaluation. The target 
of evaluation is crucially the part that represents these different layers of modification in 
the clause. It is composed of three different parts: participant-oriented modality (which 
characterizes those modal items that somehow modify the relation between participant 
and event, e.g. can in John can break this code); event-oriented modality (it concerns 
the assessment of the descriptive content of a sentence and, most importantly, does not 
involve the speaker‟s judgment, e.g. must in Thesis paper must be acid-free); and  
proposition-oriented modality (it specifies the speaker‟s judgment, or attitude, towards 
the proposition, e.g. maybe in Maybe John went to the conference). The domain of 
evaluation is related to the traditional modal distinctions: facultative (abilities), deontic, 
volitive, epistemic and evidential. According to Hengeveld (2004, in Nauze 2008), these 
two parameters should lead to 15 different combinations. However, only 10 out of the 
15 possible are actually realized, and this is due to incompatibilities between some 
values of the target evaluation and of the domain of evaluation. Nauze (2008) also 
compares Hengeveld‟s typology with Palmer‟s and notes that the most flagrant 
difference is the addition of Hengeveld‟s event-oriented modality, which he believes 
that it is situated somewhere in between Palmer‟s propositional and event modality. 
As concerns the definition of modality by van der Auwera and Plungian (1998, 
in Nauze 2008), these authors define modality as the “semantic domains that involve 
possibility and necessity as paradigmatic variants” (van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 
80) and distinguish four main types:  participant-internal modality, participant-external 
modality, deontic modality and  epistemic modality. Nauze (2008) points out that “one 
important similarity with Hengeveld‟s typology is the space created for a modality that 
is neither a judgment on the part of the speaker (propositional-oriented and epistemic, 
respectively) nor the qualification of the performance of an event by an agent 
(participant-oriented and participant-internal respectively)” (Nauze 2008: 17).  
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1.4  Other types of modality 
 
As regards modality, Palmer (2001) points out that the subtypes of modality 
summarized above are mainly relevant to the analysis of modal systems, but that there 
are, however, other grammatical categories that are associated with modality, especially 
(but not solely) with respect to mood. Here I will focus on the most important, namely 
the past tense as a modal. 
 
         1.4.1Past tense as a modal 
 
As regards past tense, Palmer (2001) explains that past tense forms may be used to 
express “unreality”, “tentativeness”, “potentiality” etc. The three past tense forms of 
will, can and may (would, could, might) can be used with past time reference, but this is 
not their most common function (so does Palmer (2001) point out). Rather, they are 
used to express greater tentativeness as in He‟d be there now, He might be there now 
and He couldn‟t be there now.  
As regards past tense and modality once again, Huddleston (1988) also states 
that there is some association between pastness and modality. He affirms: “the modal 
use of the past tense is for the most part confined to subordinate clauses, but even in 
main clauses the past tense – provided, significantly, that it is carried by a modal 
operator – can have a meaning relating to modality rather than time” (Huddleston 1988: 
81). He asks to compare you may/might be right (where might suggests a slightly 
remoter possibility), can/could you come next time? (with could considered as more 
polite than can) and he‟ll be/he‟d be about seventy now (with „d more tentative than „ll). 
Something different is explained by Falinski (2008): he highlights that would 
indicates characteristic behavior or activity, “also emphasizing the iterative 
characteristics of single actions in the past (repeated actions)” (Falinski 2008: 105). He 
also points out that only verbs which can express iterative meanings (i.e. dynamic 
verbs) or those which warrant emphasis on an iterative meaning in the context in which 
they are found are used with would. He gives, among others, the following example: 
When he came home he would sit and light his pipe. According to Falinski (2008), 
modal will and would can also express disapproval or reproach on the part of the 
speaker: She will make a nuisance of herself (“he insists on saying…”) and  He would 
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say such stupid things (“he insisted on…”). Finally, Falinski (2008) points out that 
would is used typically in written, literary language, “as a kind of stylistic reinforcement 
marker, to stress the iterative mode in an unstable past tense which […] ranges between 
durational, iterative, and singulative meanings” (Falinski 2008: 107). 
Finally, Quirk et al. (1985) explain that there is a specialized use of could, 
might, and would in which the past tense form simply adds a note of tentativeness or 
politeness. We have tentative permission in polite requests (e.g. could I see your driving 
license?; I wonder if I might borrow some coffee?), tentative volition in polite requests 
(e.g. would you lend me a dollar?) and tentative possibility in a) expressing a tentative 
opinion (e.g. There could be something wrong with the light switch; Of course, I could 
be wrong) or b) polite directives and requests (e.g. Could you (please) open the door?). 
The authors point out that in these constructions, apart from the last-mentioned case of 
requests, could and might have the same meaning, that is, this is an exceptional case in 
which could is the past tense equivalent of may instead of can.  
 
1.5 An alternative classification of modality proposed by Coates (1983): epistemic vs. 
non-epistemic modality 
Coates (1983) proposes a classification of modality which distinguishes between 
epistemic and root (i.e. non-epistemic) modality. Epistemic is a term that comes from 
the Greek episteme (i.e. “knowledge”) and it is concerned with matters of knowledge 
and belief, whereas root modality refers to the non-epistemic sense of modals, which 
deals “with obligation, permission, ability etc.” (Incharralde Besga 1998: 1). 
 
1.5.1 Epistemic modality 
As regards the first kind of modality described by the author (i.e. epistemic), according 
to Coates (1983) and also to Palmer (2001), epistemic modality indicates the speaker‟s 
confidence (or lack of confidence) in the truth of the proposition expressed. The modals 
relating to assumption are must, should and ought; those relating to an assessment of 
possibilities are may, might and could. Coates (1983) gives the following example of 
epistemic must: Paul must be in Liverpool by now, whose interpretation could be “I 
assume, taking into account what time he left home, the time now etc. that Paul is now 
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in Liverpool”. Finally, all the epistemic modals can be roughly placed at two ends of a 
scale, whose extremes represent confidence and doubt.  
1.5.2. Root (i.e. non-epistemic) modality 
As concerns the second kind of modality proposed by the author (i.e. non-epistemic), 
Coates (1983) calls non-epistemic modality “root” and does not adopt the term 
“deontic”, which seems to her inappropriate as it refers to the logic of obligation and 
permission, whereas – she adds – typical root modals such as must and may cover a 
range of meanings, of which “Obligation” and “Permission” represent only the core.1 
Indeed, she argues that all the meanings of non-epistemic must  (for instance) are related 
and can be shown to lie on a cline extending from strong “Obligation” (the core) to 
cases at the periphery where the sense of “Obligation” is extremely weak. In any case, 
there is a basic meaning: something like “it is necessary for”. So that, for example, You 
must get out of the bath now (mother to child) means “it is necessary for you to get out 
of the bath and I am going to see that you do”. 
As regards the classification of modality proposed by other authors, Falinski 
(2008) distinguishes between epistemic and root modality too, but he adds the two 
subcategories “deontic” and “dynamic” to root modality. I have already described these 
two subcategories when discussing Palmer (2001), so here I will summarize what 
Falinski (2008) adds. Deontic modality is related to obligations, prohibitions, promises, 
threats, permissions (both given and required by the speaker), offers, requests, and 
advice (asked by the speaker). These are all connected to performative verbs (i.e. verbs 
that “perform” their meaning at the moment of utterance). Moreover, the author 
explains that the term deontic comes from the Greek for “binding” and that the main 
semantic areas are obligation (must and shall), permission (may and can) and volition 
(will and shall).  
As regards dynamic modality, Falinski (2008) explains that here the modality 
is not oriented on the speaker or addresser, but oriented on the grammatical subject of 
the sentence, or neutrally on external circumstances. Together with the same modals as 
are used for deontic modality, we find semi-modals like have to, be able to and be 
supposed to, and the concept of actuality (i.e. actions carried out, rather than simply 
seen as potential). 
 
                                                          
1
 For the concept of core, see below 1.7. 
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1.6 Modal auxiliaries: the properties of the modal auxiliaries  
The modal auxiliaries have some properties that distinguish them from the other 
auxiliaries. Coates (1983), in 1.4.1., explains that in her study she was concerned with 
the modal auxiliaries by which she means must, should, ought, may, might, can, could, 
will, would, shall. They have the following characteristics: a) take negation directly 
(can‟t, mustn‟t); b) take inversion without do (can I? must I?); c) “Code” (John can 
swim and so can Bill); d) Emphasis (Ann COULD solve the problem); e) no s-form for 
third person singular (*cans, *musts), f) no non-finite forms (*to can, *musting); g) no 
co-occurrence (*may will, although Biber et al. (1999) note that some regional dialects 
allow modals in series (e.g. might could)). Coates (1983) explains that the first four of 
these are what Huddleston (1976, in Coates 1983) calls the NICE properties (Negation, 
Inversion, Code, Emphasis) and they very clearly draw a dividing line between 
auxiliaries and main verbs; the last three, which are specifically “modal” criteria, are 
needed to exclude the auxiliaries be, have and do. 
 
1.7  Modal meaning as a “fuzzy set”: the concepts of “core”, “periphery” and “skirt” 
Before focusing our attention on the analysis of the single modal auxiliaries, it is useful 
to consider some theories related to modal meaning. Coates (1983) explains that she 
initially worked with a model in which the indeterminacy of much of modal meaning 
was described in terms of gradience. This is based on Quirk‟s (1965, in Coates 1983) 
work on syntactic gradients and it implies the existence of two poles linked by a cline. 
Coates (1983) explains that an indeterminate example is said to exhibit gradience when 
it fits neither category a) nor category b), but has elements of both. However, her data 
showed, first, that it was only true to say that one extreme of any cline was “clearly 
distinct” – the other extreme often seemed to be as “fuzzy” as any intermediate point; 
and, secondly, that the majority of examples appeared to cluster between the two 
extremes, so that the gradience model no longer seemed adequate to describe her 
findings.  
Coates (1983) therefore directed her attention to Zadeh‟s (1965, in Coates 
1983) “fuzzy set theory”. This theory, as she explains, is the basis of modern 
mathematics and there is a clear relationship between the classification which takes 
place in everyday language (John is tall) and the mathematical formulation of a set (the 
set of tall people). However, membership of a set is a precise concept and this raises the 
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problem of borderline cases. Zadeh (1965, in Coates 1983) solves the problem 
suggesting sets with a continuously graded degree of membership, which he calls fuzzy 
sets. Coates (1983) states that she will use the term “fuzzy set” to mean “a class in 
which the transition from membership to non-membership is gradual rather than abrupt” 
(Zadeh 1972, in Coates 1983). She also introduces the terms “core”, “skirt”, and 
“periphery”. The core – she explains – represents the meaning learned first by children 
and yet occurs infrequently. Between the core and the periphery are found examples 
which are intermediate in grading, in the area which she calls the skirt. The majority of 
examples are found in the skirt and the periphery: the latter often has the qualities of an 
emergent category because it is often possible to define peripheral examples by contrast 
with the core. 
 
1.8 Indeterminacy in the meaning of modal auxiliaries: gradience, ambiguity and 
merger 
In her corpus of written and oral texts, Coates (1983) found three types of 
indeterminacy in the meaning of modal auxiliaries: gradience, ambiguity and merger. 
1.8.1 Gradience 
The first type of indeterminacy described by the author is gradience: Coates (1983) 
illustrates it by looking at the continuum of meaning extended from the core of  
“Ability” to the periphery of  “Possibility” found in can. Examples that belong to the 
core (e.g. I can only type very slowly as I am quite a beginner) have the following 
features: subject is animate and has agentive function; main verbs denote physical 
action/activity; and the possibility of the action is determined by inherent properties of 
the subject (this includes what the subject has learned – as in the example above). 
Similarly – the author continues – at the periphery, where can means “it is possible 
for…”, the clearest cases are those where the enabling or disabling circumstances are 
actually specified (as in You can‟t see him because he‟s having lunch with a publisher). 
Coates (1983) labels this kind of gradient “the gradient of inherency” since the 
inherency or otherwise of a property (i.e. in the example just seen, the possibility of the 
action is not determined by inherent properties of the subject) is the feature which most 
clearly distinguishes examples as being of the “Ability” type or not. 
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1.8.2 Ambiguity 
The second type of indeterminacy described by the author is ambiguity: Coates (1983) 
states that an indeterminate example is said to be ambiguous when it is not possible 
from the immediate context to decide which of two meanings is intended. An example 
is : He must understand that we mean business (Epistemic: “surely he understands that 
we mean business” or Root “it is essential that he understands that we mean business”).  
1.8.3 Merger 
The last type of indeterminacy described by the author is merger: Coates (1983) 
explains that, with merger, the two meanings involved are not in certain contexts 
mutually exclusive (“contextual neutralization”). She gives the following examples to 
illustrate this concept: Civil servants should be seen and not heard (Root should = weak 
obligation); Stuart Hallinan, defending king, asked the handcuffs should be removed 
(quasi-subjunctive should) and Rutherford suggested to Marsden that he should follow 
this up (merger between the two above meanings).  
1.9 The modals of obligation 
In the following section I will illustrate the modals of obligation must, need, should and 
ought. 
1.9.1 Must 
As concerns the first modal of obligation, must  has two main meanings, a Root 
meaning (Obligation/Necessity) and an Epistemic meaning (logical Necessity/confident 
Inference). Here are two examples given by the author: “You must play this ten times 
over”, Miss Jarrova would say […] (Root) and That place must make quite a profit for 
it was packed out and has been all week  (Epistemic). Core must is essentially 
performative and can be paraphrased by “I order you to play this”. Finally,  must  has no 
past tense form: had to supplies the missing form (as also stated by Carter and 
McCarthy 2006). 
In the interpretation of Epistemic must – Coates (1983) explains – there are two 
elements of meaning to be taken into account: first, logical inference, and secondly, the 
extent to which the speaker expresses his confidence in the truth of this inference. As 
said before, must has no past forms, but Epistemic must can refer to states and activities 
in the past through the use of the have+en construction, as in She must have been such a 
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pain in the neck to her mum and viceversa (i.e. “I confidently infer that she was such a 
pain in the neck […]”). As regards negation, Epistemic must does not occur with 
negation: can‟t supplies the missing form (as also stated by Carter and McCarthy 2006 
and Falinski 2008). 
As regards the analysis of must proposed by other authors, Carter and 
McCarthy (2006) point out that must is used for different strength of obligation (from 
polite invitations to laws) and that it is also frequently used to express deduction, 
especially to express reactions in spoken contexts (e.g. A: There was a power-cut on the 
London underground B: That must have been terrible. Er, I read about that. Yeah). 
Moreover, must and must not often occur in public signs and notices indicating law, 
rules and prohibitions (e.g. [public notice at a railway station] Passengers must not 
cross the line) and, more importantly, must in the interrogative form is used to issue 
reproaches and often expresses a feeling of exasperation on the part of the speaker, as in 
Must you have that music so loud?. References to obligations which will occur in the 
future are made with the future forms of have to (e.g. Maybe one day he will have to 
accept the inevitable truth). As regards the negative of must, Carter and McCarthy 
(2006) highlight that must not is used to forbid something, whereas need not is used to 
express an absence of obligation. Finally, the two authors also point out that mustn‟t is 
also used to express negative deductions, especially in more informal spoken contexts 
(e.g. But she said „Oh, you mustn‟t have filled it because I haven‟t got any record of you 
working those two shifts‟). 
Compared to Coates (1983), according to Falinski (2008) too, must can express 
epistemic necessity or root necessity. Of the former, he analyses negation, reference to 
the future, to the past and in the past. As regards negation, he states that the negative 
must not (mustn‟t) is used epistemically: in tag-questions (e.g. He must be there, mustn‟t 
he?); and in verbal “crossing out” (e.g. He must be there. Oh no, he mustn‟t – he must 
be at home). As regards reference to the future, according to the author epistemic must 
does not normally refer to states or activities in the future, as there generally is a danger 
of a root modality interpretation (e.g. She must be there tomorrow = epistemic? root?), 
but it can be used when there is no danger of a root modality interpretation, as in 
Something must happen soon. As regards reference to the past, the modal must is used 
with a perfective verb to indicate both past tense and present perfect meaning, as in She 
must have gone. As regards reference in the past, since must has not past tense form (as 
we know from Coates 1983 and Carter and McCarthy 2006), had to is sometimes used, 
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but only for the affirmative, whereas the negative form is couldn‟t (e.g. He had to be in. 
He couldn‟t be out → my conclusion then). As concerns root must, this ranges “from 
“subjective” to “objective”, from “strong” to “weak” meanings; from “I oblige you…” 
to “it is essential that”, to “it is important that”, and finally to “circumstances compel”” 
(Falinski 2008: 175). 
 
1.9.2 Need 
 
As regards the second modal of obligation described by the author, Coates (1983) 
distinguishes between the modal need and the related need to, and analyzes the former. 
The modal need possesses the seven criterial modal properties that I have described in 
1.6. It expresses both Root and Epistemic necessity: “I‟m very grateful to you” “You 
needn‟t be. I told you. I‟m glad to do it”(Root; paraphrase: “it isn‟t necessary for you to 
be grateful”) and oh gosh getting married is an awfully complicated business. actually, 
it needn‟t be, it can be very straight forward (Epistemic; paraphrase: “it isn‟t necessarily 
the case that it is awfully complicated”). 
Moving on to the analysis of need by other authors, Carter and McCarthy 
(2006) argue that the semi-modal need most commonly occurs in the negative 
declarative to indicate an absence of obligation (e.g. She needn‟t take the exam if she 
doesn‟t want to). On the other hand, according to the authors, affirmative declaratives 
with the semi-modal are much rarer and are associated with formal styles and contexts 
(e.g. No one else need see what he was doing either). As regards past form, the two 
authors point out that the semi-modal need has no past tense equivalent so the lexical 
verbs didn‟t need to or didn‟t have to are used to express absence of obligation in the 
past. Finally, the semi-modal need can be used with a future-in-the-past meaning (e.g. I 
was locked out but I knew I needn‟t panic because Laura would be at home at five). 
In contrast with Coates (1983), Falinski (2008) analyses both the core modal 
need, indicating root necessity, and the semi-modal need to, which is very similar to 
have to. He argues that, as a core modal, need is restricted to negative and interrogative 
contexts (e.g. You needn‟t do if you don‟t want to and Need we really do it?) and 
explains that it is found in the affirmative only when there is “negative raising” such as 
in I don‟t think he need waste his time applying here or in No citizen need fear the law, 
or in semantically negative contexts (e.g. He need do it only if it is strictly necessary). 
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On the other hand, need to is a lexical, catenative verb, expressing root necessity such as 
in She doesn‟t need to work because she‟s stinking rich.  
 
1.9.3 Should 
 
As concerns the modal of obligation should, Coates (1983) explains that this is used in 
four ways in modern English: it has a Root meaning (You should walk round the 
ramparts of the old city too), an Epistemic meaning (Have sent off my diary a couple of 
days ago – you should get it soon), it sometimes function as a quasi-subjunctive (and 
it‟s indeed fitting that there should be a splendor about these funeral rites) and it also 
supplies a first-person variant for hypothetical would. As regards Root meaning, at its 
strongest, should takes on the meaning of moral obligation or duty, while at its weakest, 
it merely offers advice or describe correct procedure.  
According to the author, in its Epistemic meaning, should expresses a tentative 
assumption, an assessment of probability based on facts known to the speaker (e.g. the 
trip should take about sixteen days = “I think it is probable that the trip will take about 
sixteen days”). Finally, both Coates (1983) and Falinski (2008) explain that, in 
subordinate that-clauses, should is common as a quasi-subjunctive in British English, 
e.g. it is not necessary that we should have the funeral bill. In this case, should is 
preceded by adjectives like legitimate, necessary and inevitable, but it also occurs after 
verbs such as ask, demand, decide. Furthermore, Falinski (2008) state that the quasi-
subjunctive should occurs after adjectives of mainly emotional states and adjectives 
indicating modality or volition. 
As regards the viewpoint of other authors, Carter and McCarthy (2006) 
summarize what Coates (1983) says by stating that should can refer to things that are 
likely or possible (e.g. It should be back to normal next week/It should be a pleasant 
day then), but that it is more frequently used to refer to things that are desirable (e.g. He 
should have been here at five and he‟s not here yet), and to give advice and make 
suggestions (e.g. You should tell him straight what you think). Interestingly, should is 
also used for surprise or thanking: as regards the former, here should is used for events 
which happened but to which the speaker reacts with surprise/disbelief (e.g. I‟m amazed 
that he should have done something so stupid); as regards the latter, shouldn‟t have is 
used conventionally to express gratitude for gifts (e.g. Thanks so much for the CD. You 
shouldn‟t have).  
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Finally, Falinski (2008) treats should and ought to together, although he 
explains that in an epistemic sense ought to is not used so extensively as should. He also 
states that in both epistemic and root modality, the main characteristic of should and 
ought to is that of relative non-commitment of the speaker. In epistemic modality this 
non-involvement takes the form of a sense of doubt (e.g. That letter should be here by 
now). Finally, should and ought to refer easily to both the present and future (e.g. The 
film should be good → present + future reference, and It ought to be ready for tomorrow 
→ assumption about the future).  
 
1.9.4 Ought 
 
Turning to the last modal of obligation, Coates (1983) explains that ought  has only a 
Root and an Epistemic meaning, both of which are, according to Carter and McCarthy 
too (2006), often synonymous with those of should. Root ought expresses weak 
obligation: it offers advice rather than gives a command. Epistemic ought is concerned 
with tentative assumption, with the speaker‟s assessment of probability based on a 
process of logical inference (e.g. the job here ought to be finished in a matter of days).  
Carter and McCarthy (2006) point out that ought to is used to refer to ideal or 
desired state of affairs, but in this case is far less frequent than should (e.g. I really 
ought to go outside and get some fresh air for a bit), and, even less frequently, ought to 
is used to state what is likely or probable (e.g. I think it ought to take about three hours, 
if the traffic is not too bad). As regards the negative form, its negative is ought not to or 
oughtn‟t to but both are infrequent, especially in informal spoken language. As concerns 
past form, ought to has no past form, and the perfect construction ought to have + -ed 
participle is used to refer back to states of affairs which were desirable in the past (e.g. 
We probably ought to have talked about it ages ago). 
 
 
 
 
1.10 The modals of ability and possibility 
 
In this section I will illustrate the modals associated with ability and possibility: can and 
could.  
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1.10.1 Can 
 
Coates (1983) states that can is the only modal auxiliary where we do not find the Root-
Epistemic distinction. According to Coates (1983) and Carter and McCarthy (2006), the 
meanings of can can be discussed under the three headings “permission”, “possibility” 
and “ability”. “Permission” can be illustrated by the example Poppy now can look at her 
little car which she can‟t drive because she hasn‟t got any insurance on it. Moreover, 
most examples of can = “permission” are concerned with the description of “rule and 
regulations”. An example of can = “ability”  is I can walk far, mister Brook, I can walk 
all the way to the mine. Coates (1983) points out that the majority of examples mean 
neither “permission” nor “ability”, but have the more neutral meaning of “possibility”. I 
can do it seen as can = “possibility” can be paraphrased as “external circumstances 
allow me to do it”. 
Carter and McCarthy (2006) explain that in the case of permission, can is 
frequently used to seek permission, give permission or, in the negative, to forbid (e.g. 
No. You can‟t have that. You might break it). Ability is frequently found with verbs of 
perception such as hear and see, and with mental process verbs such as follow (meaning 
“understand”), guess, imagine, picture, understand (e.g. I can guess what you‟re 
thinking right now). As regards possibility, can is used to indicate/assess logical 
possibilities (e.g. How can they be there already? They only left ten minutes ago). More 
interestingly, the two authors explain that can may be used in statements about events 
and states which are true or which are usually the case (e.g. Steel can resist very high 
temperatures). 
Although Coates (1983) states that can is the only modal where we do not find 
the Root-Epistemic distinction, Falinski (2008) places it under the heading “root 
possibility” and divides it roughly into three main semantic areas: permission (“human 
rules and regulation permit”), possibility (“external circumstance permit”) and ability 
(“inherent properties permit”). Permission can reflects the speaker‟s or human authority, 
rules and regulations, and other extended performative uses for “offer” and “request for 
permission” (e.g. Can I pour you a drink? and Can I smoke?). Finally, Falinski (2008) 
also states that the dividing line between “permission” and “possibility” is difficult to 
draw: for instance, in a sentence like He can go now are we talking about permission or 
possibility? 
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1.10.2 Could 
 
As concerns could, according both to Coates (1983) and Carter and McCarthy (2006), 
this modal has several meanings: Epistemic possibility = “it is possible that”; past of 
can: Root possibility = “it was possible for…”, Root permission = “it was permissible 
for…”, Root ability = “x was able to”; remote of can (conditional): Root possibility = 
“it would be possible for…”; Root permission =  “it would be permissible for…”, and 
Root ability = “x would be able to”. Root possibility is the most common meaning, with 
the two cores, particularly that of “permission”, occurring fare less frequently. 
An example of the “permission” core is Duchess and courtesans could insist on 
the „lit de parade‟ as a right based on riches, social positions, or physical attraction. 
An example of the “ability” core is “I just cannot remember a time where I couldn‟t 
swim”, she told me. Could occurs frequently as a past tense form of Root “possibility” 
can. Coates (1983) gives a typical example of could = “Root possibility” in reported 
speech: The taxi driver said that he would deposit them with the Department of English 
if he could but he felt (though) probably he‟d have to deposit them with at the porter‟s 
lodge (paraphrase: “if it‟s possible for me to do so”). 
Finally, according to the author, could functions as the hypothetical form for all 
three of the meanings identified for can. An example of hypothetical “permission” 
meaning is and they don‟t do many things which they could do legally because they 
know that this would be the death; an example of hypothetical „ability‟ meaning is all 
good salesmen and women possess four attributes without which they could not 
succeed; finally, an example of hypothetical “possibility” meaning is you know, I mean 
I could do that if I was certain I‟d got the degree results (general meaning: “if certain 
conditions where fulfilled, then nothing would prevent x”). 
As regards the viewpoint of other authors, Carter and McCarthy (2006) state 
that the most frequent uses of could are: for possibility/probability; for making 
suggestions, and as the past tense of can. Moreover, could is also used to ask for 
permission (e.g. Could I talk to you for a moment?) and could have + -ed participle is 
often used to express disapproval or criticism (e.g. You could have told me. Why did you 
keep it all for yourself?). As regards the use of could as the past tense of can, the two 
authors point out that, when actual achievements are indicated, was/were able to, not 
could, is preferred in the past affirmative clauses (e.g. The thieves escaped but the 
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police were able to arrest them later that evening), whereas the negative forms couldn‟t 
or wasn‟t/weren‟t able to are both used to indicate non-achievement (e.g. She was not 
able/she couldn‟t move on her own). 
Compared to Coates (1983), Falinski (2008) states that the semantic range of 
could can be covered in only three points: (epistemic) possibility couldn‟t; past-tense 
form of can (aspectual, ability); and hypothetical modal could/could have to indicate 
root possibility in unreal conditions. He finally states that could is the past-tense form of 
can only in the second case; it is a tentative form for can in the first case and a 
hypothetical form in perfective forms, and also conditionals (could/could have), in the 
last case.         
 
1.11 The modals of epistemic possibility 
 
In this section I will illustrate the modals of epistemic possibility, namely may, might 
and epistemic could. 
 
1.11.1 May 
 
As regards the first modal of epistemic possibility described by the author, Coates 
(1983) explains that, apart from expressing Epistemic possibility, may is also used to 
grant permission and to express Root possibility (but these uses occur only in more 
formal context); it can also be used as a quasi-subjunctive (also according to Falinski 
2008, who states that it is used in clauses with -ever determiners and adverbial clauses 
of concession) and, also according to both Carter and McCarthy (2006) and Falinski 
(2008), to express benediction/malediction (again, these two uses are rare). 
The modal may is primarily used to express Epistemic possibility, that is, to 
express the speaker‟s lack of confidence in the truth of the proposition, and it can be 
paraphrased by “it is possible that…/perhaps” (e.g. B: Have you got a pen? I‟ll leave a 
message A: I may have one). Epistemic may  is characterized by its use as a hedge, that 
is, the speaker avoids committing himself to the truth of the proposition. The Root 
meaning of may can be described in terms of a fuzzy set in which the core means, 
roughly, “it is permissible/allowed for x” and the periphery means “it is possible for x”. 
Where the context identifies some form of authority, may  is understood in terms of 
permission; when the constraining factors are identified with external circumstances, 
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then may is understood in terms of possibility. A core example of may = “permission” is 
A: May I read your message? B: yes; an example of may = “possibility” is  I‟m afraid 
this is the bank‟s final word. I tell you this so that you may make arrangements 
elsewhere if you are able to. 
As regards the analysis of may by other authors, Carter and McCarthy (2006) 
point out that may is used: for permission (i.e. to ask for, grant and refuse permission, 
although it is the most polite form among can, could and may); to refer to weak 
probability (e.g. [talking about a delivery] There‟s a bank holiday in between, so it may 
or may not get to you by the end of that week); to express concession (especially when 
accompanied by well or followed by but (e.g. Stalin may be long since dead, but 
Stalinism is not) and, more interestingly, it is used in formal written English to describe 
things which are likely to occur or which normally occur (in this sense, it is a more 
formal equivalent of can), as in Frog spawn may be found in riverbeds at that time of 
year. Finally, Falinski (2008) analyses may and might together as indicators of 
epistemic possibility concerning present or future time. He states that might possibly has 
a more tentative meaning, but only if stressed (e.g. Well, it might just be possible, I‟m 
not sure). Finally, may and might can be used to refer to both present and future, with 
the meaning of “it is possible that…is/will”.  
 
1.11.2 Might 
 
According to Coates (1983), might is associated with seven possible meanings: 
Epistemic possibility = “it is possible that x” (e.g. If I go I might get into Sainsbury‟s 
before the close); past of may: Epistemic possibility = “it was possible that x”, Root 
possibility = “it was possible for x” and Root permission = “x was allowed”; Remote of 
may (hypothetical): Epistemic possibility = “it is possible that x would…”, Root 
possibility = “it would be possible for x” and Root permission = “it would be 
permissible for x”. Coates (1983) explains that might is mainly used to express 
Epistemic possibility and as a conditional, and that, in its epistemic meaning, might, like 
may, is used as a hedge. 
As concerns the point of view of other authors, Carter and McCarthy (2006) 
state that, in general, might is a more indirect and tentative alternative to may. 
Moreover, it is used as the past form of may in indirect reports (e.g. She said that 
mother might be expecting him) and, more interestingly, it is also used to issue advice or 
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suggestions politely or indirectly, especially when used together with like or want (e.g. 
[University tutor recommending a book to a student] I won‟t go any further with it now 
but you might like to take a copy of it out with you).    
 
1.11.3 Epistemic could 
 
Like Epistemic may and might, as Coates (1983) states, could conveys the speaker‟s 
lack of confidence in the proposition expressed and can be paraphrased by “it is possible 
that…perhaps”. The modal could, unlike might and may, seems to the author to express 
only tentative possibility. An example is: Mambo, from Peter Ashworth‟s Treadwell 
stables, could be the one to give King‟s Probity most trouble […] but Nightingalls‟ 
charge  may just have the edge (paraphrase = “it is (tentatively) possible that Mambo 
will be the one to…”). Finally, Coates (1983) points out that while might  is becoming 
the main exponent of Epistemic possibility in everyday spoken language, could  is 
filling the gap left by might  and is the new exponent of tentative Epistemic possibility. 
 
1.12 The modals of volition and prediction 
 
In this section I will illustrate the modals of volition and prediction: will and shall.  
 
1.12.1 Will 
 
The first modal of volition/prediction described by the author is will. Coates (1983) 
explains that the meanings associated with will are those of “willingness”, “intention”, 
“predictability” and “prediction”, all of which are closely related to concepts of futurity 
(as stated also by Carter and McCarthy 2006 and Falinski 2008). Examples are: I mean I 
don‟t think the bibliography should suffer because we can‟t find a publisher who will do 
the whole thing (= willingness); I‟ll put them in the past today (= intention); Your 
Lordship will know what her age was (= predictability) and I think the bulk of this year 
students will go into industry (= prediction). Those meanings are subdivided into Root 
meanings (willingness + intention) and Epistemic meanings (predictability + 
prediction). Examples of will = willingness can be paraphrased by willing or want and 
have an animate subject and an agentive verb. In the case of questions, most cases of 
will you in the corpora, while overtly negative, are actually functioning as imperatives, 
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for example: will you listen to me and stop interrupting!. Will = intention is also used to 
make an arrangement, that is, the speaker states his intended course of action, which 
involves the co-operation of the addressee, who normally signals his willingness to co-
operate by saying Yes or Mm (e.g. B: all right then I‟ll see you this afternoon then A: 
Yeah). 
As regards Epistemic meanings, examples which can be assigned to the 
category “predictability” mean something like “I confidently predict that it is the case 
that p”. Epistemic will expresses the speaker‟s confidence in the truth of the proposition; 
moreover, the crucial feature of Epistemic will  is that the speaker makes a claim about 
the present (in other words, the time reference of the main predication is present, e.g. A 
commotion in the hall…”That will be Celia”, said Janet). On the other hand, examples 
of Epistemic will = prediction can be paraphrased “I predict that x” and the main 
predication always has future time reference (e.g. It will be lovely to see you).  
As regards will, Carter and McCarthy (2006) point out that it has a number of 
uses, but the reference to future time is one of its principal functions since, as we have 
already seen with Huddleston (1988), English does not have a separate, inflected future 
tense. But, apart from this use, will has other interesting uses highlighted by the two 
authors: it can be used to refer to habitual events (e.g. On a Friday night we‟ll get a 
take-away and we‟ll just relax), to make offers (e.g. I‟ll carry that for you), for requests 
and invitations (e.g. Will you pass me that newspapers please? and Will you join us for 
a drink after the concert?), for strong directives (e.g. Will you sit down and just be 
quiet!), to express disapproval (when referring to persistent actions of oneself or others, 
e.g. He will leave that door open every time he goes through). 
Another author, Falinski (2008), compares will with must. He points out that 
although the meaning of epistemic will is very close to that of must, they differ in one 
essential point: will expresses a confident statement (e.g. You will be tired after such a 
long journey), whereas must expresses a confident conclusion (logical necessity; The 
lights are on. Peter must still be in the office) or – said in other words – must is an 
expression of direct deduction, while will is not. Falinski (2008) explains that modal 
will ranges from root to epistemic meaning. Epistemic will covers a range of meaning 
from predictability to prediction (e.g. Ah! That will be the children and Children will 
often say things which make adults gasp). The root meanings of will (grammatical 
subject‟s volition) covers several meanings: volition and intention (e.g. I can‟t find 
28 
 
anyone who will do it for me), characteristic or typical behavior (e.g. He‟ll drink 
anything) and requests and commands (e.g. Will you come with me?).  
 
1.12.2 Shall 
 
The other modal of volition described by the author is shall. According to Coates 
(1983), shall has two Root meanings, one meaning “intention” and one used frequently 
in interrogatives to consult the wishes of the addressee: “addressee‟s volition”, and one 
Epistemic meaning, the weak futurity sense of prediction.  
As regards the meaning “addressee‟s volition”, the construction shall I + 
agentive verb has the effect of consulting the addressee‟s wishes: it means roughly “do 
you want me to…”, for instance shall I get a cup of coffee? can be paraphrased with 
“would you like me to get a cup of coffee?”. The time reference of the main predication 
is present: it consult the wishes of the addressee at the moment of speaking. As regards 
the Epistemic meaning “prediction”, shall in this use is very similar to will = prediction. 
Coates (1983) explains that examples of shall = prediction can all be paraphrased by “I 
predict that…/it is predictable that…” (e.g. I shall have to sort of see what Jim says 
when I see him).  
As regards the point of view of other authors, Carter and McCarthy (2006) also 
point out that shall can refer to future intentions/predictions, but that it is used in rather 
formal contexts (e.g. I shall always be grateful for what he did on that day; less formal: 
I will always be grateful […]). Moreover, it is used in directives, although this use is 
very formal and rare (e.g. [notice in an aircraft cabin] This curtain shall be left open 
during takeoff and landing).  
Finally, Falinski (2008) compares shall and must, and explains that shall, as 
must, also has a strong necessity meaning, even if it is only in “fossilized”, rather 
archaic contexts. Like Coates (1983), he also points out that shall is used in questions 
inquiring about the volition of the addressee (e.g. Shall I do it for you?), asking for 
advice or suggestions, and in implied commands or interpolations (e.g. Shall we try 
again? and What about leaving at – shall we say – 8.30?).  
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1.13 The hypothetical modals 
 
In this subsection I will discuss would, should and hypothetical meaning. 
 
1.13.1 Would 
 
The first hypothetical modal discussed by Coates (1983) is would. She explains that 
would functions as both the past tense form of will and as a general hypothetical marker. 
As regards past tense forms, we have both Root meanings and Epistemic meanings. The 
Root meanings are “willingness” and “intention”; the Epistemic meanings are 
“predictability” and “prediction”. Examples of would = willingness can be paraphrased 
by “willing to” or “prepared to” (e.g. He decided to wait in a doorway for the rain to 
stop. He wanted to think. He wouldn‟t go back to Viareggio). Compared with will = 
“intention”, would = “intention” occurs infrequently. This is – according to Coates 
(1983) – presumably due to the fact that “intention” is intrinsically bound up with the 
future. As regards would = “intention”, examples can be paraphrased by “intend to” 
(e.g. He ran his hand over the gun and the anger he felt subsided slightly. He‟d show 
her). True core examples of “predictability” make a confident assertion or prediction 
about some action/state in the past (e.g. That would be the milkman = “I confidently 
predict that that was the milkman”).  
As regards “prediction”, outside the predictability core, we find examples 
which range from those meaning “x predicted that y” to those where the sense of 
prediction is very weak. Virtually all examples of would = “prediction” occur in indirect 
or free indirect speech (e.g. She felt icy cold and completely desperate. He would have 
no hesitation about getting rid of the child as well as her). As mentioned above, would 
is also used to express hypothetical meaning. An example is: if you had that job lined 
up, would Fulbright then pay up?. The modal would also functions as a general 
hypothetical marker. An example is God knows what would happen to me if I ever got 
caught. Coates (1983) notes that although it is true to say that would  is not just the 
hypothetical marker of will = “prediction”, in the vast majority of cases in her samples 
this is would‟s function, and she therefore proposes to call this usage of would 
“Epistemic”. Finally, hypothetical would is also used pragmatically to express 
politeness or tentativeness rather than a genuine hypothesis, that is, it can be used as a 
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polite suggestion: […] I think it would cheaper for you to stay with somebody and you 
could spend the proceeds on taking us out to dinner. 
Compared to Coates (1983), Carter and McCarthy (2006) repeat most of the 
uses related to would mentioned by Coates (1983). They subdivide its uses into two 
categories: past time and other uses. As regards past time, what is not known is that 
would can refer to future-in-the-past, that is when the speaker looks forward in time 
from a point in the past (e.g. Perhaps one day he would summon the courage to speak to 
her, see how thing went). The other uses of would include its use in conditional 
sentences (where it is common in the main clause; e.g. If I had to leave, I would 
probably go to India), its use as a hedge with verbs such as advise, imagine, 
recommend, say, suggest, think (e.g. The total would be about £ 260, I would think) and 
its frequent use in requests, as a more polite or indirect form of will (e.g. Would you give 
me a call this evening?). Finally, Falinski (2008), as regards epistemic necessity, simply 
states that would, a rare substitute for epistemic will, is used as a tentative form referring 
to the present and past (e.g. That would be Jones‟s wife, I suppose? and You say there 
was a man on the stairs. That would be/would have been the bailiff).   
 
 
1.13.2. Should and hypothetical meaning  
 
The other hypothetical modal described by Coates (1983) is should. She explains that, 
apart from the fact that it is restricted to first person subjects, hypothetical should  is 
very similar to hypothetical Epistemic would. However, hypothetical should is more 
often used pragmatically, to express politeness or tentativeness (e.g. I should ask him [if 
there any seminars you ought to go to] = polite version of “Ask him if […]”). It also 
occurs particularly frequently in the phrase I should think, the hedged or tentative 
version of I think (itself a hedge), or similar expressions like I should like/imagine/say. 
For other opinions about should and hypothetical meaning, see  1.9.3. 
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Chapter 2 
MODALITY IN ACADEMIC WRITING: A FOCUS ON HEDGES AND 
BOOSTERS 
This chapter deals with hedges and boosters, two categories of epistemic modality, in 
academic writing. In the first part of this chapter I will deal with modality in expert 
academic writing; secondly, I will provide definitions of hedges and boosters; thirdly, I 
will review the most recent research on hedges and boosters in NS academic writing; 
and finally, I will focus on hedges and boosters in learners‟ academic writing. 
 
2.1 Modality in expert academic writing  
 
In this section I will investigate modality in native speakers‟ (NS) academic writing, in 
order to see which choices expert writers make and why. To begin with, the work by 
Piqué-Angordans, Posteguillo and Andreu-Besó (2001) analyzes the language of three 
different academic and professional contexts (i.e. health science, journalese and literary 
criticism) in order to identify possible variations in the use of epistemic or deontic 
modality. To this purpose, they gathered three distinct corpora: a corpus of health 
science Research Articles (RAs); a corpus of newspaper articles; and a corpus of literary 
criticism RAs dealing with American and British literature. In each corpus they 
systematically consider the modal verbs can, could, may, might, must, ought, shall, 
should, will, would and the two semi-modal verbs dare and need. The results related to 
Corpus 1 show that deontic modality is almost non-existent in health science RAs, 
representing only 2.97% of the total modal and semi-modal verbs. The results obtained 
in texts from Corpus 2 show that epistemic modality continues to be the main type of 
verb used by journalists (91.2%), although a slight increase is present with regard to 
verbal expressions with a deontic orientation. The results obtained in Corpus 3 show 
that the pattern epistemic/deontic usage is reversed with the modals must and shall, both 
of which are more frequently used in deontic expressions than in epistemic ones. 
According to the authors, there is an evident increase in the use of deontic modality if 
we compare the results obtained in Corpus 1 (where epistemic modality is close to 
100%), Corpus 2 (where it somewhat diminishes) and Corpus 3 (where there is a 
significant decrease of epistemic modality). The three authors conclude that different 
disciplines favour different types of modality, and they suggest that the combination of 
deontic modality and epistemic modality is a representative feature of (at least) RAs in 
32 
 
literary criticism, whereas health science researchers may only resort to epistemic 
modality in their RAs. 
Candlin, Crompton and Hatim (2016) focus instead on popularized RAs, 
including the use of modal verbs to indicate degrees of certainty, and on the importance 
of hedging. As regards the former point, the three authors state that “modal verbs make 
the sentences either more certain or more possible. Because research scientists want to 
find out what is possible and what is certain, modal verbs are common in research 
writing” (Candlin et al. 2016: 7). As regards the latter, they affirm that “apart from 
using modal verbs, there are other ways in which researchers show that their statements 
are not […] definite” (Candlin et al. 2016: 8). They call the use of modal verbs and 
expressions such as seem and suggest “hedging” and explain that “researchers use 
hedging to show that their statements are not based on certain knowledge but on 
reasoning from the evidence which they have” (Candlin et al. 2016: 8). I will develop 
these points further in the sections devoted to hedges and boosters. 
Finally, Gruber (2005) explains that modality is a widely used resource in 
English academic texts. Gruber (2005) refers both to Butler‟s (1990, in Gruber 2005) 
and Hyland‟s (1997, 1998, in Gruber 2005) studies. He points out that Butler (1990), in 
his study of modals in English academic texts, found that epistemic modals were far 
more frequently used than deontic modals, and that most modals were found in the 
discussion sections of academic papers or the explanation/discussion chapters of 
textbooks. However Hyland (1997, 1998) showed that metadiscoursive devices (which 
include modal constructions) were used differently in different disciplines, for example 
in “hard” and “soft” sciences. The conclusion of Gruber, therefore, is that “the 
interpretation of certain patterns of use of modal constructions has to take into account 
discipline culture” (Gruber 2005: 47). 
 
 
2.2 What are hedges? 
 
As we have just seen, epistemic modality and the related concepts of hedges and 
boosters are central to academic writing. For this reason, in this section I will provide 
definitions of hedges as proposed by some scholars, and in the following section those 
of boosters. An interesting debate about the meaning of the word hedge/hedging is 
found in Riekkinen (2009). The author states that hedging is a communicative strategy 
33 
 
which enables speakers to, for example, soften the force of their utterance. Riekkinen 
(2009) also gives background to the origin of the term hedge. She states that it was 
Lakoff who first introduced it in 1972. However, he used the term to refer to words that 
“make things fuzzier or less fuzzy” (1972: 195, in Riekkinnen 2009), so that, in this 
original sense of the word, hedging referred only to expressions such as kind of and sort 
of. Moreover, Lakoff (1972, in Riekkinnen 2009) did not consider context to be 
important for giving hedges their meaning. His ideas, in any case, have been further 
developed by a number of linguists, so that hedges are no longer seen as conveying only 
inexactitude, but also contributing to pragmatic strategies such as mitigation. Riekkinen 
(2009) then explains that Prince et al. (1982, in Riekkinen 2009) divided hedges into 
two categories: approximators and shields. Approximators are hedges that make the 
propositional content itself fuzzier, whereas shields are hedges that introduce fuzziness 
between the propositional content and the speaker, thus enabling the speaker to signal 
uncertainty and a lack of commitment to the truth of the proposition. However, 
Riekkinen (2009) adds that Markkanen and Schröder (1997, in Riekkinen 2009) 
questioned the logic of splitting hedges into semantic/pragmatic categories such as 
approximators and shields because “[both] perform the same function of expressing 
indeterminacy, of making sentences more acceptable to the hearer and thus increasing 
their chances of ratification” (Markkanen and Schröder 1997: 5). 
Like Riekkinen (2009), Skelton (1988)  also states that that the term “hedging” 
dates back to Lakoff (1972, in Skelton 1988), who spoke of “words whose job is to 
make things fuzzy or less fuzzy”. Lakoff (1972, in Skelton 1988) gives, as an example 
of what he means, the way we might talk about birds. Eagles, for instance, are birds, 
whereas a chicken is a sort of bird, and that sort of  is a hedge. Skelton (1988) explains 
that there a large numbers of ways in which one can hedge in English: for instance, 
through the use of impersonal phrases, the modal system or verbs like seem and appear. 
He also specifies that it is a pity that the word hedging, with the pejorative connotations 
of its ordinary language use, has been adopted, and, like Riekkinen (2009), he also 
explains that Prince et al. (1982, in Skelton 1988) divided hedges into two categories: 
shields and approximators. In shields, they suggested, the speaker is hedged: their 
degree of commitment to a proposition is stated (e.g. I suspect the moon is not made of 
green cheese after all), whereas in approximators the proposition itself is hedged: the 
extent to which is true is stated (e.g. It‟s made of some sort of rock stuff). 
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Like most of the other authors, Crompton (1997) reviews and evaluates some 
of the different ways in which the term hedge has been understood and defined in the 
literature. He states, first of all, that Lakoff (1972, in Crompton 1997) introduced the 
subcategory of performative hedges, which modify the illocutionary force of the speech 
act they accompany. Then, he explains that Prince et al. (1982, in Crompton 1997) 
counted the number of words and phrases in their corpus which made things “fuzzier” 
and analyzed each item as falling into one of two categories: approximators and shields, 
which we have just seen. On the other hand, Skelton (1988, in Crompton 1997) 
proposes the abandonment of the term hedge in favor of a distinction between 
proposition and comment (where hedges would be designated commentative language). 
In the same article, Crompton (1997) argues that Salager-Meyer (1994, in Crompton 
1997) focuses on the relationship between hedging and modesty, arguing that “hedges 
are first and foremost the product of a mental attitude which looks for proto-typical 
linguistic forms” (Salager-Meyer 1994: 274-275). Crompton (1997), however, believes 
that rather than seeing hedging as a reflex of personal qualities such as attitude and 
modesty, hedges are better understood as a product of social forces. For example, the 
hedge as far as I can see mitigates the claim being made in that the readers are still 
allowed to judge for themselves. Finally, a different rationale behind hedging in 
academic writing is emphasized by Hyland (1994, in Crompton 1997), who identifies 
hedging with epistemic modality as defined by Lyons: “any utterance in which the 
speaker explicitly qualifies his commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed by 
the sentence he utters […] is an epistemically modal or modalised sentence” (Lyons 
1997:797, in Crompton 1997).  
After having focused on the different ways in which the term hedge has been 
understood and defined in the literature, Crompton (1997) also focuses on the 
taxonomies of hedges by briefly reviewing those forms researchers have chosen to 
regard as hedges: Skelton (1988, in Crompton 1997) chose copulas other than be, modal 
auxiliaries and lexical verbs such as believing and arguing. Cited in Crompton (1997), 
we find Myers (1989), Hyland (1994) and Salager-Meyer (1994). Myers (1989) listed 
modal conditional verbs and modifiers, whereas Hyland (1994) omitted approximators 
but included, as well as epistemically modal expressions, if-clauses, question forms, 
passivisation, impersonal phrases and time reference. Finally, Salager-Meyer (1994) 
identified  shields, approximators, expressions of the authors‟ personal doubt and direct 
involvement (e.g. we believe) and emotionally charged intensifiers (e.g. particularly 
35 
 
encouraging). Crompton (1997) points out how this brief study of how the term hedge 
has been used in the literature suggests that the only item on which there seems to be 
complete agreement is copulas other than be. He therefore tries to suggest the following 
definition for hedges in academic writing, which applies only to hedges on proposition: 
“a hedge is an item of language which a speaker uses to explicitly qualify his/her lack of 
commitment” (Crompton 1997: 281). He also proposes the following test for 
determining whether or not a proposition is hedged: “can the proposition be restated in 
such a way that it is not changed but that the author‟s commitment to it is greater than at 
present? If “yes”, then the proposition is hedged” (Crompton 1997: 282). Finally, the 
author suggests the following characterization of hedged propositions: 
 
a) sentences with copulas other than be; b) sentences with modals used epistemically; c) 
sentences with clauses relating to the probability of the subsequent proposition being true; d) sentences 
containing sentence adverbials which relate to the probability of the proposition being true; e) sentences 
containing reported propositions where the author(s) can be taken to be responsible for any tentativeness 
in the verbal group, or non-use of factive reporting verbs such as show, demonstrate, prove […], and f) 
sentences containing a reported proposition that a hypothesized entity X exists and the author(s) can be 
taken to be responsible for making the hypothesis (Crompton 1997: 284). 
 
Another author (Hyland 1995) focuses specifically on the functions of hedging 
in scientific writing. He gives a definition of hedging and describes the three functions 
of hedging in this kind of writing. He states that hedging “represents an absence of 
certainty and is used here to describe any linguistic item or strategy employed to 
indicate either a) a lack of commitment to the truth value of an accompanying 
proposition or b) a desire not to express that commitment categorically” (Hyland 1995: 
34). The three functions of hedging are the following: first, hedges allow writers to 
express propositions with greater precision in areas often characterized by reformulation 
and reinterpretation; secondly, hedges are related to the writer‟s desire to anticipate 
possible negative consequences of being proved wrong; finally, hedges contribute to the 
development of the writer-reader relationship, addressing the need for deference and 
cooperation in gaining reader‟s ratification of claims. 
As regards the types of hedges that we can find, Hyland (1996) explains that 
hedging is the expression of tentativeness and possibility and it is central to academic 
writing where the need to present unproven propositions with caution and precision is 
essential. According to the author, hedges can be divided into two types: content- and 
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reader-oriented. Content-oriented hedges are related to claims that “have to correspond 
with what is believed to be true in the world” (Hyland 1996: 5), whereas reader-oriented 
hedges refer to propositions which could be presented from an objective perspective but 
that are explicitly hedged because of readers‟ considerations. Moreover, the author 
argues that content-oriented hedges can be subdivided into two further categories: 
accuracy-oriented hedges (related to the obligation to present claims as accurately as 
possible) and writer-oriented hedges (related to the need to anticipate what may be 
harmful to the writer). Hyland (1996) also focuses on the fact that analysis of epistemic 
language use reveals that hedges are polypragmatic (i.e. they can convey a range of 
different meanings, often at the same time) so that they do not fit into a neat scheme of 
discrete categories.  
The author then discusses in detail content-oriented hedges and writer-oriented 
hedges. He explains that the former hedge the correspondence between what the writer 
says about the world and what the world is thought to be like. Then, he focuses on 
accuracy-oriented hedges – which “involve the writer‟s desire to express propositions 
with greater precision in areas often subject to revision” (Hyland 1996: 9) and whose 
main function is to imply that the proposition is based on plausible reasoning in the 
absence of certain knowledge – and on attribute hedges, which “enable writers to 
restructure categories, define entities and conceptualise processes more exactly to 
distinguish how far results approximate to an idealised state” (Hyland 1996: 10). 
Writer-oriented hedges limit the writer‟s commitment to statements. While accuracy-
oriented hedges are proposition focused and seek to increase precision by referring to 
the exact state of knowledge, writer-oriented hedges are writer-focused and aim to 
shield the writer from the consequences of opposition by limiting personal commitment. 
Hyland (1996) argues that the most distinctive signal of  writer-oriented hedges is the 
absence of writer agency. Finally, reader-oriented hedges mark claims as provisional, 
inviting the reader to participate in a dialogue. 
After this explanation, Hyland (1996) summarizes the three main functions of 
hedging in scientific RAs: to present claims with greater precision; to signal 
reservations in the truth of a claim; to limit the professional damage which might result 
from bald propositional content and to give deference and recognition to the reader and 
avoid unacceptable over-confidence. However, the author also highlights that a 
principal feature of hedging is indeterminacy, so that particular forms are always likely 
to carry more than one meaning.  
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2.3  What are boosters? 
 
Boosters, although much less frequently used than hedges, are also important in 
academic writing. For this reason, I will provide some definitions of boosters proposed 
by scholars. One is given by Yagiz and Demir (2015): they state that “boosting, also 
called intensifier or certainty marker interchangeably, is an issue studied under 
metadiscourse” (Yagiz and Demir 2015: 12). Moreover, “boosters may be thought as 
metadiscoursal markers aiming to strengthen writers‟ claims on the issue […]. They 
have a purpose of increasing the propositions, and prove the writer‟s engagement and 
commitment to his/her statements” (Yagiz and Demir 2015: 12). A similar perspective 
is found in Yeganeh et al. (2014): they also see hedges and boosters as meta-discourse 
markers. According to these authors:  
 
hedges show the speaker‟s unwillingness to present propositional information categorically, 
such as seem, probably, could. These words and utterances indicate the speaker‟s uncertainty; that is, he 
or she talks about what he or she does not have enough information. […] It can also be used as a way of 
avoidance from full responsibility for the statement in utterance. So, as Yule (1996) claims hedges violate 
the quality of maxim of Grice (1975) (Yeganeh et al. 2014: 680).  
 
On the other hand, expressions used to indicate strong persuasion are described as 
boosters (e.g. clearly, obviously, and of course). They indicate strong persuasion and 
also show engagement and solidarity with the audience by emphasizing shared 
information, group membership, and direct engagement. Finally, Hyland (1998) refers 
to hedges and boosters as “the expression of doubt and certainty” (Hyland 1998: 1) and 
to hedges as “a resource for expressing uncertainty, skepticism and deference in 
academic contexts” (Hyland 1998: 1). He adds that hedges and boosters are 
communicative strategies for reducing or increasing the force of statements, 
respectively. More specifically:  
 
boosters such as clearly, obviously and of course, allow writers to express conviction and assert 
a proposition with confidence, representing a strong claim about a state of affairs. […] They also mark 
involvement and solidarity with an audience, stressing shared information, group membership, and direct 
engagement with readers (Hyland 1998: 2); hedges, like possible, might and perhaps, on the other hand, 
represent a weakening of a claim through an explicit qualification of the writer‟s commitment. This may 
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be to show doubt and indicate that information is presented as opinion rather than accredited fact, or it 
may be to convey deference, humility, and respect for colleagues views  (Hyland 1998: 2) 
 
Hyland (1998) then concludes his explanation by stating that “hedges and boosters […] 
draw attention to the fact that statements don‟t just communicate ideas, but also the 
writer‟s attitude to them and to readers” (Hyland 1998: 3).    
 
2.4 Hedges and boosters in NS academic writing and corpora 
 
In this section, I will refer to the studies by Hyland (2001), Vázquez and Giner (2009), 
and Kim and Lim (2015). Hyland (2001) deals with epistemic modality in academic 
argument. He first introduces the definitions of hedges and boosters (on which I will not 
focus since we have already seen them in sections 2.2 and 2.3) and then he presents the 
data of his study. As regards the data, this consists of a corpus of published articles 
related to different disciplines (i.e. mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, 
marketing, philosophy, sociology, applied linguistics, physics and microbiology) 
together with a series of interviews with members of the relevant discourse 
communities. The results show two important findings. The first is that hedges exceed 
boosters by nearly 3 to 1, which, according to the author, reflects the need for claims to 
be presented provisionally. The second finding is that there is a broad division between 
the soft knowledge fields of philosophy, marketing, linguistic and sociology on one 
hand, and physics and engineering on the other. Indeed, over 70% of all hedges occur in 
the humanities/social science papers. According to the author, this result reveals a clear 
distinction between the sciences and humanity social sciences. Indeed, he goes on to say 
that, in the soft fields, research cannot be reported with the same confidence as shared 
assumptions because, compared to hard sciences, soft-knowledge areas are more 
interpretative and less abstract, and so it has to be expressed more cautiously using more 
hedges.  
On the other hand, Vázquez and Giner (2009) focus specifically on boosters. 
Indeed, their study is based on the analysis of RAs randomly selected from three 
disciplines (Marketing, Biology and Mechanical Engineering). Their main aim is to 
understand to what extent boosters are used in these fields with a persuasive and 
intensifying value. The results of their study show that the number of boosters differs a 
great deal in each discipline, as expected by the authors. Indeed, the results reveal that 
the total number of boosters per 1,000 words in the three disciplines indicates that 
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proportionally there is a major presence of boosters in the subject area of Marketing. In 
particular, the number of boosters in this area seems to be double the quantity found in 
the discipline of Biology and that found in Mechanical Engineering. The two authors 
explain this result by arguing that the data included in the RAs of Marketing are not 
very precise, but rather based on speculations. As a consequence, the nature of this 
science seems to strongly influence the use of interactional elements like boosters. A 
striking result is that regarding boosters in Mechanical Engineering RAs: “According to 
certain theories regarding academic writing – the two scholars point out – authors in 
hard sciences did not seem to feel the need of using persuasive linguistic tools in their 
discourse” (Vázquez and Giner 2009: 227) because these are based on reliable data. 
Nevertheless, the data in the authors‟ analysis reveal a considerable amount of boosting, 
which reminds one of the quantity of boosters found in the RAs belonging to the 
discipline of Biology. Vázquez and Giner (2009) explain that Biology spans everything, 
so that this discipline uses data that are both numerical and not. Consequently, the 
number of boosters locates this discipline in a middle point between the other two 
disciplines. As concerns Mechanical Engineering, the two authors point out that  
although the accurate data of this discipline may appear to be very assertive one must 
also consider that there do not seem to be absolute truths. Moreover, hard sciences 
construct new knowledge departing from the negation of statements derived from 
accurate data. As a consequence, boosters contribute to the assurance of new statements 
in defense of the author‟s work. 
Finally, the paper by Kim and Lim (2015) attempts to explore the linguistic 
realizations of hedges in academic writing using Hyland‟s (1996, in Kim and Lim 2015) 
categorization of hedging devices. To this purpose, thirty research article discussions 
restricted to empirical studies were randomly selected from the Journal of English for 
Academic Purposes. The authors specify that Hyland (1996, in Kim and Lim 2015) 
divides hedges into two main categories, that is content-oriented and reader-oriented, 
which I have already discussed in section 2.2. The findings show that writer-oriented 
hedges are linguistically realized by impersonal subjects with epistemic speculative 
verbs (e.g. the following section will discuss…and suggest), passive constructions (e.g. 
can be discussed), reference to a wider body of knowledges through the use of non-
integral citations, and reference to information presented earlier in the article (e.g. as 
evidenced in Table 1). As regards attribute-oriented hedges, these are realized by 
adverbs (degree of precision; e.g. somewhat), style disjuncts (e.g. generally), sentence 
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adverbs (e.g. essentially), and the use of qualification (e.g. considering the content and 
structure of the course). The realization of reliability-oriented hedges include modal 
verbs (e.g. may), adverbs of certainty which weaken the force of an attribute (e.g. likely) 
and evidential verbs (e.g. seem). Finally, reader-oriented hedges are realized by first-
person pronouns (e.g. we), adverbs/sentence modifiers (e.g. arguably), hypothetical 
conditionals (e.g. if), and contrastive connectors (e.g. however). According to the 
authors, these findings generally suggest that hedging is a salient feature of academic 
discourse and that its appropriate use is central to the process of weighing fact and 
evaluation, which is at the heart of academic writing.  
 
 
2.5 Hedges and boosters in learners‟ academic writing  
 
In this section I will first refer to the studies by Hyland (2000), Hyland and Milton 
(1997), Hinkel (2005 & 2009), Hsin-I (2010), Serholt (2012), and Khrosravian et al. 
(2014); then to the studies by  Seškauskiène (2008) and Hyland (2000); and finally to 
the study by Chunyu and Xuyan (2015). The first group of authors all deal with 
epistemic devices (i.e. a general term that, in our case, refers to hedges and boosters) by 
comparing differences and similarities related to the use of hedges and boosters between 
NS and NNS, sometimes focusing also on the possible differences between male and 
female students (as is the case of Serholt 2012). 
 First of all, Hyland (2000) draws on various studies of L2 students‟ academic 
writing, focusing on hedging and second language writers, and he states that, despite the 
significance of hedging, proficiency in this area appears to be difficult to achieve in a 
foreign language. More specifically, the author argues that there seem to be four main 
reasons that explain the reasons why students have difficulties with hedging:  a) a single 
expression can convey a range of meanings; b) hedging can be expressed in a large 
variety of ways; c) students may be confused by cross-cultural differences in expressing 
doubt and certainty, and d) students tend to receive poor advice from their published 
textbooks. As regards point a), could, for instance, can convey ability, permission and 
possibility. In addition, hedges do not only convey the writer‟s confidence in the truth of 
information but they also contribute to a relationship with the reader. So, for example, a 
writer may strongly believe something is true, but hedge it out of consideration for the 
readers‟ opinions. As regards point b), hedging can be signaled in many different ways, 
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not only by modal verbs, but also by other items (among them, epistemic verbs, 
sentence adverbs of probability, epistemic adjectives or adjectival clauses etc.). As 
concerns point c), the author states that there are variations in how different cultures and 
languages express arguments. For example, academic writing in German and Czech 
seems to be more direct than in English, whereas Japanese and Chinese seem to prefer 
more cautious and indirect argument patterns than typically expected in English. 
Finally, as regards point d), the author points out that hedges are generally ignored or 
misrepresented in style guides and textbooks. Hyland (2000) points out that there have 
been some recent improvement in this picture, but generally research interest in hedging 
has not been translated into pedagogic materials. In addition, problems are duplicated by 
teachers who rely on textbooks as sources for their own courses and by students who 
regard textbooks as containing all they need to learn. 
Hyland and Milton (1997) also state that the ability to express doubt and 
certainty (i.e. the use of hedges and boosters) appropriately in English is a complex task 
for language learners, but critical for successful academic writing. Their paper compares 
the expression of doubt and certainty in the examination scripts of 900 Cantonese 
speaking school leavers writing in English with those of 770 British learners of similar 
age and educational level, with the aim of determining the typical forms and meanings 
used by the two groups to present claims in academic English prose. The two scholars 
explain that modal expressions are complex for a number of reasons: first, they can 
simultaneously convey a range of different meanings so that they can be understood 
only by attending to the context; secondly, students experience difficulties because 
epistemic meanings can be signaled in many different ways; finally, the significance of 
epistemic devices is largely ignored  in style guides. 
 The analysis reveals remarkable similarities in the overall frequencies with 
students from both samples employing one device every 53 words. There are also 
considerable similarities of usage, although with strikingly different frequencies. 
Indeed, for instance, epistemic will occurs twice as often in the NNS sample while 
would is represented twice as frequently in the NS data. According to the two scholars, 
these distributions suggest conceptual differences, with L2 writers favouring confident 
prediction, whereas NS use more tentative expressions. The analysis of the grammatical 
distribution of epistemic devices also show marked differences in the use of adverbs and 
modal verbs. Indeed, L2 writers appear to depend far more heavily on modal verbs than 
NS. Moreover, there seems to be a popularity of adverbs over semantically equivalent 
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verb forms in L2 writings which, according to the two authors, may be due to 
uncertainty in how to employ lexical verbs appropriately in stating claims.  
The scholars also analyze the categories of epistemic commitment. The results 
confirm that the academic writing of many L2 learners is characterized by firmer 
assertions, a more authoritative tone and stronger commitments when compared with 
native speaker discourse. According to Hyland and Milton (1997), this could be due to 
inadequate linguistic knowledge on the part of Chinese students or, alternatively, it 
could result from an imperfect awareness of appropriate language use, that is, while 
students may typically be more indirect when writing in Chinese, they overcompensate 
in English (so this finding is in contrast with what we have just seen in Hyland 2000). 
The authors conclude their article by pointing out once again that the manipulation of 
certainty and affect in academic writing is particularly problematic for the L2 students. 
They also highlight that this study refers to only one L2 language group, but that the 
literature suggests it is unlikely that Hong Kong students differ greatly from other 
learners in the difficulties they experience in expressing doubt and certainty in English. 
As regards Hinkel‟s (2005) study, the author analyzes the types and 
frequencies of hedges and intensifiers (also known as boosters) employed in NS and 
NNS (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indonesian, Vietnamese, and Arabic) academic 
essays included in a corpus of L1 and L2 student academic texts. More specifically, six 
hedging devices were examined: epistemic hedges (e.g. clearly, mostly), lexical hedges 
(e.g. kind of, maybe), possibility hedges (e.g. perhaps, possibly), downtoners (e.g. a bit, 
nearly), assertive pronouns (any- and some-words) and adverbs of frequency (e.g. often, 
usually). In addition, three types of intensifiers are also included: universal pronouns 
(every- and no-words), amplifiers (e.g. extremely, completely) and emphatics (e.g. 
sure/for sure, no way). The 745 NS and 626 NNS wrote their essays in response to three 
assigned prompts: a) some people believe that when parents make their children‟s lives 
too easy, they can actually harm their children instead. Explain your views on this issue; 
b) many people believe that grades do not encourage learning. Do you agree or disagree 
with this opinion?, and c) some people choose their major field of study based on their 
personal interests […]. Other choose major in fields with a large number of jobs and 
options for employment. What position do you support? 
As regards the results, the author says that the median frequency rates of the 
first three types of hedges imply that L2 academic prose contained fewer hedging 
devices than that of NS writers. This can be compared to Hyland and Milton‟s (1997) 
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study, which states that the academic writing of many L2 learners is characterized by 
firmer assertions, a more authoritative tone and stronger commitments when compared 
with native speaker writing, which means that NNS use less hedges and more boosters 
than NS. Moreover, the L2 prose of, for example, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and 
Indonesian speakers, seems to rely extensively on epistemic but not other types of 
hedges. What is more interesting, however, is Hinkel‟s (2005) argument that, on the 
whole, the data demonstrate that the frequencies and types of hedges in L2 academic 
writing are severely restricted and limited to those that are associated with casual 
spoken interactions. According to the author, these findings are not surprising because 
even in the case of academically-bound students, conversational discourse constitutes 
their preeminent venue of exposure to L2. In addition to these findings, Hinkel (2005) 
repeats what we already know thanks to Hyland and Milton (1997), that is, NNS 
writers‟ essays seem to be prone to exaggerations and overstatements, possibly due to 
the high rates of universal pronouns, amplifiers, and emphatics in their texts, whereas 
NS students tend to rely less on such universal pronouns as no and every-words and are 
able to express their ideas without relying on intensifiers to the same extent.  
Hinkel‟s (2009) study examines, instead, NS and NNS uses of 
possibility/ability and obligation/necessity modal verbs in a small corpus of L1 and L2 
academic essays. The essays included in the corpus were written in response to five 
prompts in five different topic areas: the first three prompts were already examined in 
the study we have just seen (Hinkel 2005), the other two prompts were the following: a) 
some people learn best when a classroom lesson is presented in a serious, formal 
manner. Others prefer a lesson that is enjoyable and entertaining. What position do you 
support?, and b) some of the wealthiest, most famous people in the world are musicians, 
singers, movie stars and athletes. Do you think these performers and athletes deserve 
salaries such as millions of dollars every year? 
Hinkel (2009) discusses first possibility and ability modals and then obligation 
and necessity modals. The author argues that the uses of possibility and ability modals 
(such as can, may, might, could and to be able to) in written academic discourse 
contribute to the broad range of syntactic and lexical means of hedging, while obligation 
and necessity modals have several pragmatic functions, for example they can be used to 
strengthen the writer‟s claim and import an element of objectivity. As regards the results 
of possibility and ability modals in L1 and L2 student writing, the median frequency 
rates of these modals are similar among most groups.  
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As concerns the L1 and L2 uses of obligation and necessity modals, the author 
presents a different picture. Here in the essays on the topics of Parents, Grades, Major 
and Manner, speakers of Chinese, Japanese, Korean employed significantly higher rates 
of these verbs than NS did. According to the author, the uses of obligation/necessity 
modals in the writing of these ethnic groups can be particularly culture- and topic-
dependent. Indeed, Hinkel (2009) notes that personally distant and less culturally-bound 
topics, namely the L1 and L2 essays on the topics of wealthy athletes and entertainers, 
do not contain high rates of obligation/necessity modals, maybe because – according to 
the author – these essays largely consist of fact-based argumentation. 
As regards Hsin-I‟s (2010) study, this author first introduces the notion of 
interlanguage pragmatics (ILP), which is defined as the study of non-native speakers‟ 
use and acquisition of linguistic actions patterns in a second language (L2); then 
explains that the present study adopts a corpus-based approach to examining both NS 
and NNS corpora in terms of the use of epistemic devices in academic writing. The two 
corpora are a native English speaker corpus (the academic prose section of BNC baby) 
and a learner corpus, Chinese Learner English Corpus (CLEC). Nine epistemic devices 
were selected from the list of the most frequent epistemic devices in academic writing: 
two modal verbs (may, might), five adjectives (possible, likely, unlikely, certain, sure) 
and two adverbs (possibly and probably). The results show a remarkable difference in 
the total frequency of the epistemic modality used by NS and NNS. Indeed, epistemic 
modality appeared in the NNS and NS corpora for a total of 18.76 and 48.8 per 10,000 
words, respectively. Moreover, the two groups also differ from each other in the 
frequency of the nine epistemic devices. For instance, in the case of epistemic modal 
verbs, the NS writers use may and might more frequently than the NNS writers, and 
when we consider the epistemic modality used by the NNS writers with different 
proficiency levels, further differences become apparent: indeed, the results indicate an 
increasing use of may and might in the NNS corpus with increasing proficiency levels. 
To sum up, the findings not only confirm the fact that L2 writers employ significantly 
fewer hedges but more boosters when compared with the NS in academic writing, but 
also demonstrate that, with increasing proficiency, the NNS writers perform more like 
the NS writers in terms of their linguistic behaviors in applying epistemic devices in 
writing. In other words – the author explains – there is a developmental continuum of 
L2 pragmatic competence and performance. 
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On the other hand, Serholt‟s (2012) study has a twofold aim: the primary aim is 
to investigate the overall frequency in which Swedish learners of English use epistemic 
modality to express doubt (hedges) and certainty (boosters) in their academic writing, 
and if there is any gender-related differences; the secondary aim is to study if the 
frequency of hedges and boosters occur in varying degree in the different sections of 
their academic essays. The hedges and boosters used in the study are: suggest, may, 
seem, appear, could, might, assume, likely, possible/possibly, speculate, believe, 
indicate, probable/probably (hedges); show that, always, demonstrate, substantially, 
fact that, obviously show, clear/clearly, definite/definitely and certain/certainly 
(boosters). The author explains that only linguistic C-essays (i.e. bachelor thesis) that 
follow the IMRAD model (Introduction, Method, Results and Discussion) were 
included in the study, and that the material consisted of 20 essays: 10 written by female 
students and 10 by male students. 
The data suggest that Swedish learners of English use hedges more frequently 
than boosters regardless of gender. Furthermore, the results indicate that some hedges 
were used more often than others. For instance, the modal verbs might, could and may 
appear to be the most frequently used hedges for both groups. As concerns boosters, the 
students in her study did not seem to use boosters excessively, since they occurred 
merely once or twice per 1,000 words. Moreover, the results of the study indicate a 
distinct preference for certain boosters. The results suggest that boosters such as 
substantially and demonstrate were rather infrequently used among students.  
As concerns the frequency with which hedges and booster were found in the 
different sections of the essays, the distribution turned out to be fairly similar for both 
gender groups. Moreover, the results indicate that both hedges and boosters were 
commonly used in the Introduction as well as in the Discussion, whereas the remaining 
sections comprised significantly fewer hedges and boosters. The conclusion of the 
author is that gender does not seem to be a determining factor for Swedish students of 
English when it comes to softening or asserting a statement in academic writing. 
Khosravian et al. (2014), instead, focus specifically on hedges: their study 
examines the types and frequency of hedges employed by Persian and English native 
speakers in the introduction section of academic RAs in the field of literature. To this 
purpose, a corpus of forty RAs published in national and international journals were 
selected. The authors aimed at answering the following research questions: a) do 
Persian and English native speakers employ the same types of hedges in the 
46 
 
introduction of their academic RAs? and b) do Persian and English native speakers 
employ the same number of hedges in the introduction of their academic RAs? 
To analyze the data, the three main categories of main verbs, non-main verbs 
and modal auxiliaries were used to show the distribution of hedging form in this study. 
As concerns the types of hedging devices, main verbs, non-main verbs and especially 
modal auxiliaries employed by English RAs writers are more than those applied by 
Persian RAs writers. Also, the percentage of the total number of hedging forms reveals 
that English RAs writers employed hedges twice as much as Persian RAs writers did. 
Moreover, the data analysis reveals that there was a difference between the choice of 
terms used as hedging devices in the articles written by English native authors and 
Persian native authors in terms of their type and frequency: more specifically, English 
native writers used  modal auxiliaries, evidential main verbs, adjectives and nouns in 
RAs more frequently than their Persian native writers counterparts. These results 
confirm what we have already seen with Hsin-I (2010), that is “the tendency toward 
using fewer hedges by NNS might be explained by the observation that non-native 
speakers with a lower-level proficiency hedge less than those with a higher level of 
proficiency” (Khosravian et al. 2014: 1684, my citation). 
Both Šeškauskienè (2008) and Hyland (2000) focus on the Lexical Invisibility 
Hypothesis (LIH). The LIH argues that in the text intensifiers (i.e. a synonym for 
boosters) are “invisible” whereas hedges are even more “invisible”. In this context, 
Šeškauskienè‟s (2008) research aims at testing the LIH on non-native speakers of 
English– Lithuanian students majoring in English and writing their graduation papers in 
linguistic or language-related areas. The general results show that the five most frequent 
hedges are can, some, may, try and certain, whereas the least frequent hedges include 
apparently, basically, fairly, largely, possibly, seemingly etc. The author also discusses 
the interpretation of the results by stating that the corpus has manifested a high 
frequency of modals, which is in conformity with the general tendency of hedging in 
English.  
The author concludes that this investigation has shown that the LIH does not 
work in the texts produced by more advanced and proficient non-native users of 
English. “Moreover – Šeškauskienè (2008) adds – the present investigation has 
established that hedging in L2 of proficient users of English has not been less frequent 
than the average frequency of hedging in the papers of competent users of English” 
(Šeškauskienè 2008: 75). Finally, the results of the investigation show that the 
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interference of the socio-pragmatic background has been overestimated because this 
investigation could be seen as a proof to the argument that, when acquiring a language, 
many NNS also acquire many of its textual and metadiscoursal features, including 
hedging, boosting etc.  
As explained before, Hyland (2000) also examines the LIH. The author 
explains that the purpose of his study is to present data from a small retrospective think 
aloud study (i.e. a method which involves recording participants‟ utterances as they 
attempt to perform a task) which explore how 14 Cantonese L1 undergraduate respond 
to hedges and boosters in an academic text. More specifically, the students were either 
at their first or final year of study for a BA in English for Professional Communication 
at Hong Kong university. For purposes of validity, participants were not told the precise 
focus of the study. The data comprised taped interview data, which sought to elicit 
subjects‟ awareness of hedges and boosters after completing a comprehension task, and 
a questionnaire which focused more directly on their understanding of these items. The 
general results show that students attended to hedges and boosters in only 50 out of 210 
possible cases, and that boosters tended to be more visible than hedges. The author then 
focuses on the results of the questionnaire. The results indicate that participants had 
great difficulties in assigning an appropriate degree of certainty to hedges and that, 
while boosters were generally identified correctly, subjects tended to overestimate the 
strength of statements. So, in contrast with Šeškauskienè‟s (2008) study, this study 
seems to show that the LIH does work on NNS of English. 
Finally, Chunyu and Xuyan (2015) also analyze epistemic modality in the 
argumentative essays of Chinese EFL learners. They start by mentioning the fact that 
epistemic modality, as we have just seen, is generally acknowledged to be difficult for 
both first and second language learners to acquire. Considering that the essay topics in 
previous studies are not well controlled, Chunyu and Xuyan‟s (2015) paper sets out to 
explore much more comparable data from the International Corpus Network of Asian 
Learners of English (ICNALE) with the purpose of investigating how similar (or 
different) L1 and L2 writers employ epistemic devices (EDs) and how L2 learners‟ use 
of EDs changes with their general English proficiency. For the EFL participants, their 
proficiencies are classified into four levels: A2, B1-1, B1-2 and B2+. As regards the 
semantic distribution of EDs, the results show that all learners, like the native group, 
used notably more hedges than boosters in their essays, which is in sharp contrast with 
many previous studies, for example the one above by Hyland and Milton (1997). 
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Moreover, higher ability students modify their statements with less certainty markers 
and more tentative expressions than their L1 counterparts. As concerns the grammatical 
distribution of EDs, the results show broad agreement between the most advanced L2 
group and the L1 group in the use of adverbials and nouns to express degrees of 
certainty, but marked differences in the use of modals, lexical verbs and adjectives.  
Section 5 of Chunyu and Xuyan‟s (2015) paper is devoted to the discussion of 
factors that influence L2 writers‟ use of EDs: the inherent properties of English EDs, L2 
modal instruction and learner factors. As concerns the first point, form complexity, for 
instance, is an important factor to determine which item learners prefer so that, for 
example, students will prefer, between probably and maybe, the less complex maybe. 
As regards the second point (i.e. modal instruction), the most frequent item may in the 
textbooks is also the most frequently used one by learners, and the infrequent form 
probably in the textbooks is also infrequent in learners‟ output, although not all 
learners‟ modal behavior is traceable to input frequency. As regards the third point (i.e. 
learner factors), the two authors focus on L1 influence and the one-to-one principle. L1 
influence refers to the fact that, since there already exists a powerful L1 modal system, 
learners will probably transfer everything they can in order to establish form-meaning 
relationship. On the other hand, the one-to-one principle states that one form is mapped 
onto a single meaning, so that when, for example, maybe becomes the dominant form to 
mark epistemic possibility, other devices such as perhaps,  possibly and probably 
become less significant. According to the authors, all the identified factors interact 
continuously in intricate ways. 
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Chapter 3 
MATERIALS, METHODS AND ANALYSIS OF THE CORPUS 
 
In this chapter I will first analyze a corpus of 136 essays written by non-native speakers 
of English and then I will compare it with a corpus of academic writing written by 
expert writers of English. My purpose is to see how hedges and boosters are used by 
NNS of English and to compare this use with that of expert writers. More specifically, I 
aim at answering the following research questions: 1a+1b) Do ESL learners (in our 
case, Italian students of English) use more hedges or boosters in academic writing? And 
compared to expert writers of English? ; 2a+2b+2c+2d) What are the five most 
commonly used hedges in academic writing by these students? What are the five most 
commonly used boosters in academic writing by these students? What are the five most 
commonly used hedges in academic writing by expert writers? What are the five most 
commonly used boosters in academic writing by expert writers?; 3a+3b) As Hyland and 
Milton (1997) argue, are the expressions of doubt and certainty (i.e. hedges and 
boosters, respectively) difficult to master for non-native speakers of English (in our 
case, for Italian students of English)? And if so, is this a culture-related phenomenon? 
But first of all, I will provide some information related to the materials and the methods 
used for my investigation. 
3.1 Materials 
As mentioned above, in order to see how hedges and boosters are used both by NNS of 
English and by expert writers, I have collected a corpus of 136 essays written in English 
by Italian students of the University of Padua graduating in Discipline della mediazione 
linguistica e culturale. The texts were written by both male and female third-year-
students and consist of short argumentative essays related to the topic of bilingualism. 
For the contrast with the expert writers of English, I also have collected a corpus of 20 
academic writing written by expert writers of English. I found the articles for this 
second corpus by looking at the International Journal of Bilingualism, which was found 
under the Catalogo dei Periodici Elettronici, available at the University and Padua and 
also at home (but, in this second case, one has to download and install the Proxy Docile 
to access the catalogue). Here is a table with the main information about the NNS 
corpus: 
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Text types Student essays 
Language  English 
Authorship NNS students studying English at the University of 
Padua 
Subject Bilingualism 
Date 2016 
N° of texts 136 
N° of types 3,806 
N° of tokens 75,880 
Average length of 
texts 
558 words 
Table 1: main information about NNS corpus 
Here, instead, is the table with the main information about NS corpus (i.e. the one 
written by expert writers of English): 
Text types Journal articles 
Language  English 
Authorship Expert writers writing for the International Journal of 
Bilingualism 
Subject Bilingualism 
Date 2007-2016 
N° of texts 20 
N° of types 8,113 
N° of tokens 128,670 
Average length of 
texts 
6,434 words 
Table 2: main information about expert writers‟ corpus 
 
 
3.2 Methods 
In order to analyze the corpora, first of all I have prepared a list of hedges and one of 
boosters. These items were collected by looking at instances of hedges and boosters in 
51 
 
the articles and books used for chapter 2. In these lists I tried to include modal verbs, 
lexical verbs, adverbs, and other expressions. The list of hedges include the following 
lexical items: may, would, possible/possibly, the possibility that, could, might, can, try, 
attempt, think, believe, according to, normally, essentially, hypothesize, speculate, 
assume, suggest, indicate, propose, seem, assumption, about, probable, probably, 
presumably, usually, rarely, virtually, as much as, it is unlikely/likely, perhaps, it 
appears that, apparently, should, partially, one implication of my research, it is 
unclear, approximately, generally, quite, and maybe (for a total of 44 hedges 
examined). The list of boosters, on the other hand, include the following elements: must, 
the fact that, research shows that, it is clear, clearly, surely, definitely, strongly, 
actually, it is evident that, indeed, always, obviously, one obvious implication, of 
course, demonstrate, highly, it is generally believed, and it is undoubtedly (for a total of 
19 boosters examined). The total of hedges found in the NNS corpus is 1,579, whereas 
that of boosters is 193; the total of hedges found in the first eleven journal articles of the 
expert writers‟ corpus is 782, whereas that of boosters is 140. The normalized frequency 
per 10,000 words is: of 208 hedges in the NNS corpus and of 25 boosters in the NNS 
corpus; in the expert writers‟ corpus, it is of 61 hedges and of 11 boosters. 
For the analysis of the first corpus I used the AntConc concordancing software, 
which is downloadable for free on the website of Professor Laurence Anthony:  
http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/. I used the concordance button to see 
the concordances of each hedge and booster, and clicked on the text button to see each 
hedge and booster in context, in order to determine whether that specific element was a 
real hedge/booster or not. For instance, about appeared 129 times in the first corpus, but 
only once with the meaning of “more or less”, which I considered to be a real hedge 
since it was used as an approximator, whereas the other times it was used to introduce a 
complement of specification (i.e. mainly about bilingual education). Here is the only 
example of about in the NNS corpus used as an approximator: 
1  In the world we live in today, there are 196 sovereign states, yet the 
spoken languages are about 6000.  
I also paid attention to the fact that these hedges/boosters were not inserted in 
citations of other authors, in order to provide just examples used by non-native speakers 
of English, namely Italian students of this language. This and the procedure described 
above was applied also to the expert writers‟ corpus. 
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3.3 Results of the investigation 
 
The number of real hedges and boosters (together with the totals and the percentage) are 
provided in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. These lists follow the alphabetical order. 
 
HEDGE(S) N° 
OF 
HIT
S 
N° OF 
HEDGE
S 
PERCENTAG
E (=number of 
each hedge/ 
total number of 
hedges x 100) 
About 129 1 0.06% 
According to 157 155 9.82% 
Apparently 3 2 0.13% 
Approximatel
y 
1 1 0.06% 
As much as 6 2 0.13% 
Assume 6 2 0.13% 
Assumption 0 0 0% 
Attempt 3 0 0% 
Believe 29 29 1.84% 
Can 503 392 24.82% 
Could 231 219 13.87% 
Essentially 0 0 0% 
Generally 25 22 1.39% 
Hypothesize 0 0 0% 
Indicate 8 6 0.38% 
It appears that 0 0 0% 
It is likely 3 2 0.13% 
It is unclear 0 0 0% 
It is unlikely 0 0 0% 
May 305 234 14.82% 
Maybe 7 6 0.38% 
Might 92 87 5.51% 
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Normally 1 1 0.06% 
One 
implication of 
my research 
0 0 0% 
Partially 2 1 0.06% 
Perhaps 6 6 0.38% 
Possible 66 55 3.48% 
Possibly 0 0 0% 
Presumably 0 0 0% 
Probable 2 2 0.13% 
Probably 21 20 1.27% 
Propose 0 0 0% 
Quite 9 6 0.38% 
Rarely 1 1 0.06% 
Seem 20 19 1.20% 
Should 164 152 9.63% 
Speculate 0 0 0% 
Suggest 18 12 0.76% 
The possibility 
that 
0 0 0% 
Think 88 31 1.96% 
Try  28 26 1.65% 
Usually 29 17 1.08% 
Virtually 0 0 0% 
Would 80 70 4.43% 
TOTALS        2,043 1,579 100.06% 
  Table 3: number of hits, of hedges and percentage in the NNS corpus 
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BOOSTER(S
) 
N° 
OF 
HIT
S 
N° OF 
BOOSTER
S 
PERCENTAG
E (=number of 
each 
booster/total 
number of 
boosters x 100) 
Actually 15 8 4.15% 
Always 59 14 7.25% 
Clearly 14 5 2.59% 
Definitely 15 11 5.7% 
Demonstrate 0 0 0% 
Highly 3 1 0.52% 
Indeed 61 59 30.56% 
It is clear 6 4 2.07% 
It is evident 1 1 0.52% 
It is 
generally 
believed 
0 0 0% 
It is 
undoubtedly 
0 0 0% 
Must 36 30 15.54% 
Obviously 6 5 2.59% 
Of course 8 6 3.11% 
One obvious 
implication 
0 0 0% 
Research 
shows that 
2 2 1.04% 
Strongly 13 12 6.22% 
Surely 12 9 4.66% 
The fact that 28 26 13.47% 
TOTALS 279 193 99.99% 
Table 4: number of hits, of boosters and percentage in the NNS corpus 
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We can therefore reply to the first research question: 1) Do ESL learners (i.e. in 
our case, Italian students of English) use more hedges or boosters in academic writing? 
From the analysis of this corpus, it seems that Italian students of English use far more 
hedges than boosters in academic writing: we have a total of 1,579 hedges and a total of 
193 boosters (although we must consider that the list of hedges is longer than that of 
boosters). Moreover, this finding is in contrast with some of the studies we have seen in 
chapter 2. It does not confirm the studies by Hyland (2000), who stated that NNS 
experience difficulties with the use of hedging and with Hinkel (2005), who stated that 
NNS writing is prone to exaggerations and overstatements. Only Serholt (2012) stated 
that, in her case, Swedish learners of English (i.e. L2 learners) used hedges more 
frequently than boosters (and this regardless of gender). 
We can also answer the second research question: 2a) what are the five most 
commonly used hedges by these students?, 2b) what are the five most commonly used 
boosters by these students? Here Table 5 shows the five most commonly used hedges 
by these students: 
 
Most commonly used hedges N° of hedges 
1. Can 392 
2. May 234 
3. Could 219 
4. According to 155 
5. Should 152 
Table 5: The five most commonly used hedges by NNS students 
 
 
 
As one can see, the five most commonly used hedges by these students are the 
following: the modal verbs can (392 hedges, which represents the 24.82% of the total 
number of hedges; e.g. Bilinguals can be described as “people who develop some 
knowledge and ability in a second language”), may (234 hedges, 14.82%; e.g.  But, 
speaking two languages and being part of two different cultures may represent a 
problem of identity), could (219 hedges, 13.87%; e.g. At the beginning children who 
have both monolingual parents could have difficulties to learn the foreign language 
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talked at school and parents could not help them in this problem), the expression 
according to (155 hedges, 9.82%; e.g. According to Baker and Prys Jones (1998: 5), 
bilingualism: “…is usually reserved to describe two languages within an individual”), 
and finally the modal verb should (152 hedges, 9.63%; e.g.  In addition teachers should 
not be worried about changings but they should keep themselves up to date, for instance 
through technology).  
On the other hand, the five most commonly used boosters by these students are 
provided by Table 6: 
 
Most commonly used boosters N° of boosters 
1. Indeed 59 
2. Must 30 
3. The fact that 26 
4. Strongly 12 
5. Surely 9 
Table 6: The five most commonly used boosters by NNS students 
 
 
 
As one can see,  the five most commonly used boosters by these students 
include: indeed (59 boosters, 30.56%; e.g. It is indeed this last purpose which inspired 
the experiments of the University of Padua conducted between 2008 and 2009), which is 
by far the most commonly used booster in my sample, must (30 boosters, 15.54%; e.g. 
There is indeed evidence to stress the importance of promoting bilingualism. This is 
why, bilingual children‟s parents must enable them to obtain a full proficiency in both 
the children‟s first and second language), the fact that (26 boosters, 13.47%; e.g.  when 
bilingual children are exposed to another culture, they are able to manifest a good 
approach with it, whereas monolingual children do not. This can be due to the fact that 
the former is predisposed to enter in other cultures), strongly (12 boosters, 6.22%; e.g.  
this is one of the main reason why bilingual education should be strongly valorised), 
and surely (9 boosters, 4.66%; e.g. All things considered, raising a child as a bilingual 
is surely challenging because there would be many problems to figure out, not only 
concerning children themselves but also parents). However, if we look at the 
percentages which I have just reported in brackets, we can see that there is only a slight 
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difference between hedges and boosters, and that in the case of indeed this booster 
supersedes the hedge can (30.56% vs. 24.82%). 
There are also other interesting findings. In the table of hedges, we can see that 
some hedges did not appear at all in the corpus, for example hypothesize, speculate, 
propose, assumption, presumably etc. It is probable that these students are less familiar 
with these verbs and expressions so that they could not use them. Also, I did not report 
it in the table, but believe was sometimes used with strongly and firmly before, which 
makes it somewhat more of a booster than of a hedge. Here are the instances of believe 
with strongly and firmly before: 
1  The fact some friends of mine are bilingual and they have almost all 
the advantages above, brings me to support this view and to strongly believe in the 
importance of growing up a child as bilingual.  
2  I strongly believe that no parent should fear bilingualism and deprive 
his/her child of this extraordinary chance that makes the “linguistic semiotic capital of 
human kind […] as rich and as diversified as possible” (Kramsch, 1998: 77). 
3 Thus, “the bilingual has the chance of bridging that generation gap, 
building closer relationship with relatives, and feeling a sense of belonging and 
rootedness with the extended family” (Baker, Colin & Prys Jones, Sylvia. 1998).  I 
firmly believe this aspect is often not considered. 
As regards boosters, also in the case of boosters we find expressions like one 
obvious implication, demonstrate, it is generally believed and it is undoubtedly which 
are missing in the corpus. 
 
The following tables provide the number of real hedges and boosters (together 
with the totals and the percentage) for the first eleven articles of the expert writers‟ 
corpus. 
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HEDGE(S) N° 
OF 
HIT
S 
N° OF 
HEDGE
S 
PERCENTAG
E (=number of 
each hedge/ 
total number of 
hedges x 100) 
About 76 9 1.15% 
According to  36 14 1.79% 
Apparently 0 0 0% 
Approximatel
y 
3 3 0.38% 
As much as 8 7 0.9% 
Assume 4 3 0.38% 
Assumption 9 7 0.9% 
Attempt 8 8 1.02% 
Believe 3 2 0.26% 
Can 252 191 24.4% 
Could 56 49 6.27% 
Essentially 3 2 0.26% 
Generally 14 11 1.41% 
Hypothesize 0 0 0% 
Indicate 11 6 0.77% 
It appears that 1 1 0.13% 
It is likely 2 2 0.26% 
It is unclear 0 0 0% 
It is unlikely 1 1 0.13% 
May 181         167 21.4% 
Maybe 6 5 0.64% 
Might 28 27 3.45% 
Normally 3 3 0.38% 
One 
implication of 
my/our 
research 
0 0 0% 
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Partially 2 2 0.26% 
Perhaps 6 6 0.77% 
Possible 39 31 3.96% 
Possibly 2 1 0.13% 
Presumably 1 1 0.13% 
Probable 0 0 0% 
Probably          11 11 1.41% 
Propose 7 6 0.77% 
Quite 21 20 2.56% 
Rarely 9 4 0.51% 
Seem 16 16 2.05% 
Should 38 34 4.35% 
Speculate 1 1 0.13% 
Suggest           22 21 2.69% 
The possibility 
that 
4 3 0.38% 
Think 22 20 2.56% 
Try  7 2 0.26% 
Usually 21 21 2.69% 
Virtually 1 0 0% 
Would          90 64 8.18% 
TOTALS 999 782 100.07% 
  Table 7: number of hits, of hedges and percentage in the first eleven articles of the 
expert writers‟ corpus 
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BOOSTER(S
) 
N° 
OF 
HIT
S 
N° OF 
BOOSTER
S 
PERCENTAG
E (=number of 
each 
booster/total 
number of 
boosters x 100) 
Actually 10 7 5% 
Always 20 12 8.57% 
Clearly 32 24 17.14% 
Definitely 4 2 1.43% 
Demonstrate 9 6 4.29% 
Highly 8 4 2.86% 
Indeed 17 17 12.14% 
It is clear 7 6 4.29% 
It is evident 3 3 2.14% 
It is 
generally 
believed 
0 0 0% 
It is 
undoubtedly 
0 0          0% 
Must 29 27 19.29% 
Obviously 2 2 1.43% 
Of course 11 3 2.14% 
One obvious 
implication 
0 0 0% 
Research 
shows that 
1 1 0.71% 
Strongly         7 5 3.57% 
Surely 0 0 0% 
The fact that 26 21 15% 
TOTALS 186 140          100% 
Table 8: number of hits, of boosters and percentage in the first eleven articles of the 
expert writers‟ corpus 
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In this case too, I have prepared two tables with the most commonly used hedges and 
boosters by expert writers of English, namely Tables 9 and 10. 
 
Most commonly used hedges N° of hedges 
1. Can 191 
2. May 167 
3. Would 64 
4. Could 49 
5. Should 34 
Table 9: The five most commonly used hedges by expert writers of English 
 
Most commonly used boosters N° of boosters 
1. Must 27 
2. The fact that 21 
3. Clearly 24 
4. Indeed 17 
5. Always 12 
Table 10: The five most commonly used boosters by expert writers of English 
 
As one can see, there are both similarities and differences between the two 
corpora. By comparing Table 9 with Table 5, we can see that both can (e.g. We can 
assume that there are many such people in the catchment area of the Spanglish 
Times[…]) and may (e.g. All these are “noise” factors that may trigger a bilingual 
mode (or an intermediary mode) and hence product contact phenomena which cannot 
be classified as transferences/interferences) are the first two most commonly used 
hedges by both NNS and expert writers. Could (e.g. […] it could be assumed that the 
emotional stimuli produce systematic increases in physiological arousal across different 
experimental settings), instead, was the third most commonly used hedge by NNS, 
whereas it becomes the fourth most commonly used hedge by expert writers. Should 
(e.g. We should note here that it is rare that the two cultures have the same importance 
in the life of the bicultural) is the fifth  most commonly used hedge by both NNS and 
expert writers of English. According to (e.g. According to Gumperz (1971, 1995) 
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speech communities are based on language repertoires of conventionalized social 
styles) is present only in Table 5.  
By comparing Table 10 with Table 6, instead, we can see again both similarities 
and differences between NNS and expert writers of English. Indeed (e.g. Indeed 
Natasha was found to use the L1 for about 75 per cent of the lesson) which was the first 
most commonly used booster by NNS, becomes only the fourth most commonly used 
booster by expert writers of English. Must (e.g. Other factors must also be present […]) 
and the fact that (e.g. The fact that fast activation of word semantics was found in L2 is 
also in line with research showing that not only L1 but also L2 word forms can 
automatically access their underlying semantic representation very quickly […]) are 
very much used by both NNS and expert writers, although they are, respectively, the 
second and the third most commonly used boosters in the NNS corpus, and the first and 
the second most commonly used boosters in the expert writers‟ corpus. Strongly and 
surely are absent from Table 10, and we find instead clearly (third place; e.g. Clearly, 
for a rich analysis of this multilingual advertisement, both visual and linguistic aspects 
must be taken into account) and always (fifth place; e.g. I am not sure that speakers 
always “recognize” such errors, as Paradis writes ). 
As I would like to provide a more qualitative analysis, I will now look in greater 
detail at how one hedge and one booster, namely the commonly found in the NNS 
corpus hedge according to and the commonly found in the expert writers‟ corpus 
booster clearly, respectively, are used in the two corpora. First of all, I will provide 
definitions of according to found in dictionaries and grammars. 
As regards this hedge, The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English 
(2003) gives the following three definitions (with relative examples) of according to 
(indicated as preposition): 1) as shown by something or stated by someone (e.g. 
According to the police, his attackers beat him with a blunt instrument); 2) in a way that 
depends on differences in situations or amounts (e.g. You will be paid according to the 
amount of work you do); 3) in a way that agrees with a system or a plan, or obeys a set 
of rules (e.g. The game will be played according to rules laid down for the 1992 Cup). 
Under definition 1 we also find this important note: “ Do not say “according to me” or 
“according to my opinion/point of view”. Say in my opinion: in my opinion his first 
book is much better”. 
On the other hand, in the Pocket Oxford Thesaurus (2008) we find instead 
synonyms of according to under according (which is indicated as an adverb): we have 
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two entries with two relative examples. The first one is Cook the rice according to 
instructions and the synonyms are: in line with, as per, in accordance with. The second 
one is Salary will be fixed according to experience and the synonyms are: in proportion 
to, proportional to, commensurate with, in relation to, relative to, again in line with and 
corresponding to. 
If we look at online definitions of this hedge, we can see that the website of the 
Cambridge English Dictionary
2
 subdivides the definitions for English into two 
categories: the first one is according to (opinion), the second one is according to 
(method). As regards the first definition, we find “as stated by” (e.g. According to Sarah 
they're not getting on very well at the moment); as regards the second definition, we find 
“in a way that agrees with” (e.g. Students are all put in different groups according 
to their ability). This website also provides the definitions for American English (“as 
stated by”; “in a way that agrees with; by”) and Business English (“used for saying 
which person, group, piece of information, etc. provides a particular fact”, e.g. 
According to a company spokesman, the firm is expected to have sales of more than 
$3.5 billion this year). Once again on the webpage that I have reported, we find 
according to related to grammar (from English Grammar Today). This is what is stated: 
“According to means „as reported by‟ or „as stated by‟ and refers to an opinion which is 
not the speaker‟s opinion. According to usually occurs in front position. It is commonly 
followed by a noun phrase and sometimes by a clause: According to Jeff, the film starts 
at 7.30; According to the instructions, you‟ll need to buy some glue; The 
government, according to a poll taken last month, may lose the next election. We often 
use according to in formal contexts to refer to official evidence such as statistics or 
reports: According to a recent report by the Department of Health, most people still do 
not take enough exercise. According to also means „depending on‟ or „in agreement 
with‟: They take a test and are then put in to groups according to their ability; The 
rents are high but they vary according to whether you want a garden. Typical error: we 
only use according to when we refer to an opinion from someone else or somewhere 
else. When we talk about our opinion, we use phrases such as „in my opinion‟ or „in our 
view‟: In my opinion, they were not very polite. Not: According to me …”. 
As concerns other websites, the website of the Collins English Dictionary
3
 
reports various acceptations of the expression according to. The first one states: “If 
                                                          
2
 Here is the link for according to: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/according-to 
3
 Here is the link for according to: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/according-to 
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someone says that something is true according to a particular person, book, or other 
source of information, they are indicating where they got their information” (e.g. Philip 
stayed at the hotel, according to Mr Hemming). Synonyms are: as claimed by, in the 
opinion of, on the authority of, as stated by. The second one states: “If something is 
done according to a particular set of principles, these principles are used as a basis for 
the way it is done” (e.g. They must take their own decision according to their own legal 
advice). Synonyms are: in keeping with, in line with, consistent with, in accordance 
with. The third one states: “If something varies according to a changing factor, it varies 
in a way that is determined by this factor” (e.g. Prices vary according to the quantity 
ordered). Synonyms are: in relation to, depending on, in proportion to, proportional to. 
The website also distinguishes between British and American English. The definitions 
provided for BrE are the same of those I have just reported; those for AmE are: 1. in 
agreement with 2. in the order of (e.g. arranged according to size) 3. as stated in or 
reported by.
4
 
Very similar definitions are given also by the website of the MacMillan 
Dictionary.
5
 It is stated that: “1) if you do something according to a plan, system, or set 
of rules, you do it in a way that agrees with or obeys that plan, system, or set of rules 
(e.g. We should try to play the game according to the rules). Synonyms and related 
words: According to something: according to, under, by... ; 2) used for saying where 
information or ideas have come from (e.g. According to newspaper reports, fighting has 
broken out in the northern provinces). Synonyms and related words: According to 
someone: according to, officially, in someone‟s opinion...; 3) used for saying that 
something changes or is different depending on the situation (e.g. Each child will be 
helped according to his or her needs). Synonyms and related words: According to 
something: according to, under, by...” 
Finally, as concerns websites once again, the website of the English Oxford 
Living Dictionaries
6
 reports other similar definitions under according (which is 
indicated as an adverb): 1) usually according to:  As stated by or in (e.g. the outlook for 
investors is not bright, according to financial experts). Synonyms: as stated by, as 
maintained by, as claimed by, on the authority of, on the report of, in the opinion of; 2) 
In a manner corresponding or conforming to (e.g. cook the rice according to the 
                                                          
4
 These definitions are taken from the Webster‟s New World College Dictionary, 4th Edition. Copyright © 2010 by 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. All rights reserved. 
5
 Here is the link for according to: https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/according-to. 
6
 Here is the link for according to: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/according. 
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instructions). Synonyms: as specified by, as per, in accordance with, in compliance 
with, in agreement with, in line with, in keeping with, commensurate with, in harmony 
with, in conformity with, in obedience to, true to, in fulfillment of, following, honouring, 
heeding, observing; 3) In proportion or relation to (salary will be fixed according to 
experience). Synonyms: in proportion to, proportional to, commensurate with, in 
relation to, relative to, corresponding to, dependent on, based on. 
Finally, as concerns grammars, Downing and Locke (2006) do not give a 
definition of according to, but list it under the two-word prepositions, explaining that 
these consists of a preposition, an adjective, an adverb or a conjunction followed by one 
of the prepositions for, from, of, to, with. The authors also state that, in most cases, the 
meaning is expressed by the first word, the second serving to link the preposition to the 
complement (as is the case with according to). 
I will now make a comparison between the learners‟ corpus and the expert 
writers‟ corpus by dividing examples of according to in the NNS corpus into three 
categories: 
 - examples of according to exactly used in the same way of expert writers; 
-  examples of according to that are actually mistakes in the students‟ corpus; 
- examples of according to differently used than expert writers but not grammatically 
incorrect. 
As regards the first point, most examples are exactly used in the same way of expert 
writers. For instance:  
According to Francois Grosjean bilingualism is not a rare phenomenon and “is found 
in all parts of the world, at all levels of society, in all age groups” 
 
According to Baker and Prys Jones (1998 :469) there are weak and strong forms of 
bilingual education. 
The widespread idea according to which bilingual people master two languages in the 
same way and with the same proficiency concerns a very small number of bilinguals. 
 
According to Baker and Prys Jones (1998: 5), bilingualism: “…is usually reserved to 
describe two languages within an individual” 
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So this system is not enough, and according to Professor Rebecca Oxford (Oxford, 
Rebecca L. 1990): “It is likely that learning1 and acquisition2 are not mutually 
exclusive but are rather parts of a potentially integrated experience […] 
 
According to Dr Carol Griffith it has become known only in 1975 with an article 
written by Joan Rubin, in which she defined the learning strategies as “the techniques 
or devices which a learner may use to acquire knowledge” or simply “what students 
do” (Griffiths, Carol. 2008:1) 
 
According to most people, bilinguals should reach the same ( high) level in both of their 
languages and consider themselves as bicultural as well. 
 
According to Baker and Jones :” [...]few bilinguals are equally proficient in both 
languages, even though this is often thought to be the case. One languages tends to be 
stronger and better developed than the other”. 
 
In addition , according to Riley (Riley, Philip. 2007.) there is a “close relationship 
between “occupation” and vocabulary” that is to say, the more we are immersed in a 
certain context, the more we learn and we express by means of that vocabulary, “ […] 
you are much  more likely to know and use domain specific terms if you are a 
practitioner in the domain in question” according to Kramsch 1998, chapter 1). 
 
Professor Grosjean […] asserts that “becoming bicultural is at times more difficult 
than becoming bilingual”. Some young people decide to live following only one culture 
and according to his studies, people could be dissatisfied with this decision in future. 
 
Does he would be able to switch way of thinking according to the language that she or 
he wants to speak? 
According to what a sociolinguistic said, bilingualism defines a person who has some 
functional ability in a second language (Spolsky, 1998). 
 
They can easily switch languages according to the situation and the people around 
them. 
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Furthermore grammar and vocabulary vary according to the people speaker [sic] is 
talking to. 
 
as Grosjean says, a bilingual person can have the possibility to interchange the two 
languages, according to different situations and contexts. 
 
[…] this “brain training” is very helpful, mostly for kids: it can build more elastic 
minds as they can switch the two or more languages according to situations. 
 
Table 11: Examples of according to used in the same way of expert writers 
As regards the second point, there are three mistakes in the NNS corpus: two examples 
with *according to me and one with *according to my point of view (instead of in my 
opinion). Here are the examples: 
Now, *according to me and according to what she said, she feels richer than another 
American girl does, because of her knowledge. 
 
*According to me, he/she should talk language as much as he/she talks his/her mother 
tongue. 
 
*According to my point of view, this is one of the main reason why bilingual education 
should be strongly valorized. 
 
     Table 12: Examples of according to that are actually mistakes in the learners‟ corpus  
As regards the third point, there are no examples of according to used differently from 
expert writers but not grammatically incorrect, so I decided to focus on the examples of 
the expert writers corpus that look more complex than those of the NNS: 
According  to  the nature of  the  study,  these  features would be  included or put 
aside. 
[…] participants were asked to rate the words according to their unpleasantness. 
According to this view, differences in emotionality of L1 and L2 depend on the age 
of acquisition 
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According to the emotional contexts of learning theory, differences between L1 and 
L2 would be predicted, as the bilinguals were late learners of L2 and reported a 
lower level of proficiency in this language. 
The  stimuli  consisted  of  four  lists  of  20  English words, which were selected 
according to their emotional content (for full list of items see  Appendix 2). 
 
[…] not all behaviours, beliefs and attitudes  can  be  modified  according  to  the  
cultural  situation  the  bicultural  person  is  in.  
 
In fact, as we will see later on  in this paper, many biculturals only identify with the 
one or the other culture, or sometimes do not identify with either, even  though  they  
are  bicultural  according  to  the  characteristics  given  above. 
Thus, many biculturals will know how to adapt to such situations as welcoming 
monocultural acquaintances at home, holding a meeting at home, dealing with 
relatives who belong to just one culture, doing business with the  local  
administration,  dressing  according  to  the  context  and  so  on.   
 
The following is an individual account of the observed data as well as the reasoning 
provided by each teacher  (via the questionnaires and interviews) presented 
according to their degree of L1 use.  
 
According  to the local language maxim, speakers will prefer English whenever 
possible, since it is the official language of the court. 
 
The CCT was presented in either English or French  according to the child‟s L1. 
 
According to parental reports, our sample of 24-month-old bilinguals had 
developed an expressive vocabulary size in L1 that was smaller than that of 
monolinguals. 
 
According  to  the  investigation  of  Roberts  (2005),  the  English-as-a-foreign-
language  speaker avoids idiomaticity (formulaic expressions)[…] 
according to this line of argument, this is really an advertisement for a Spanish 
speaker, although it has the appearance of one addressed to a bilingual. 
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For example, in an accounting record regarding candles, the Latin (but almost-
English) word candela ends with an abbreviation that allows it to be read as 
candle‟  or  „candelarum‟ (the genitive plural, and correct Latin form in this 
instance), „according to competence  and choice‟ (Wright, 2000, p. 151). 
 
 Table 13: Examples of according to of the expert writers corpus that look more 
complex than those of the NNS corpus 
 
I will now follow the same procedure for the booster clearly. As regards the 
definitions of this booster in paper dictionaries, the Longman Dictionary of 
Contemporary English (2003) lists three entries for the booster clearly: “1) [sentence 
adverb] without any doubt = obviously: Clearly, ignoring him had been a mistake; 2) in 
a way that is easy to see, hear, or understand: Please speak clearly/ The economy was 
clearly failing; 3) in a way that is sensible: I wasn‟t thinking clearly” (2003: 274). On 
the other hand, the Pocket Oxford Thesaurus (2008) lists the synonyms of  clearly 
(indicated as an adverb) under two entries: “1) write clearly: intelligibly, plainly, 
distinctly, comprehensibly, legibly, audibly; 2) clearly, substantial changes are needed: 
obviously, evidently, patently, unquestionably, undoubtedly, without doubt, plainly, 
undeniably, incontrovertibly, doubtless, it goes without saying, needless to say” (2008: 
128). 
As regards websites, the website of the Cambridge English Dictionary 
7
 reports 
three entries for the English meaning of clearly: clearly (easy to understand: in a way 
that is easy to see, hear, read, or understand), clearly (certain: used to show that 
you think something is obvious or certain), and clearly (not confused: When 
you think clearly, you are not confused). The respective examples are (I will list here 
just one example for each entry, where there are any): When you fill in 
the form, please write clearly in black ink; Clearly, you should tell her the truth, 
whereas for the third entry there are no examples given. As regards the American 
meanings, we find two acceptations: clearly (understandably: in a way that is easy to 
understand, or easy to see or hear) and clearly (certainly: certainly; obviously; without 
doubt). The respective examples are:  I think this report clearly shows why we have 
to act now and The accident was clearly the truck driver‟s fault. 
                                                          
7
 Here is the link for clearly: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/clearly. 
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 Another website, namely that of the English Oxford Living Dictionaries 
8
, 
gives two entries, but they are connected to each other: 1) in a clear manner; with 
clarity: „her ability to write clearly, [as submodifier] „on white paper, the seeds are 
clearly visible and 1.1) [sentence adverb]  Without doubt; obviously, „clearly, things 
have changed in the last six weeks‟. 
Furthermore, the website of the Macmillan Dictionary 
9
 lists three acceptations 
of clearly: 1) used for showing that what you are saying is true and that most people 
will realize this, e.g. Both companies clearly like to do things their own way; 2) in a way 
that people can easily see, hear, or understand, e.g. His contract clearly states that he 
cannot leave before next year, and 3) in a way that is sensible and not confused, e.g. 
You can‟t think clearly on four hours‟ sleep. The synonyms and related words for 
number 1 are actually, certainly, clearly..., those for number 2 are 
obvious, apparent, show up..., and finally those for number 3 (on the website indicated 
actually as “a”) are alert, lucid, be clear that... 
Finally, the website of the Oxford Learner‟s Dictionaries10 lists three 
definitions that are very similar to those listed above: 1) in a way that is easy to see or 
hear (e.g. It's difficult to see anything clearly in this mirror); 2) in a way that is sensible 
and easy to understand (e.g. She explained everything very clearly) and 3) used to 
emphasize that what you are saying is obvious and true (e.g. Clearly, this will cost a lot 
more than we realized; it is also indicated that its synonym is obviously). 
As concerns grammars, Downing and Locke (2006) do not provide a definition 
for clearly, but list the general characteristics of adverbs and adverbial groups, here 
summarized: 1) adverbs modify verbs, clauses, adjectives and other adverbs; 2) adverbs 
and adverbial groups function typically in the clause as Adjunct or Complement, and in 
group structures as pre-modifier and post-modifier; 3) adverbs and adverbial groups 
express a variety of types and subtypes of meaning; 4) they perform a wide variety of 
syntactic functions; 5) they can occupy different positions in clause structure; and 6) 
they are very frequently optional. 
As I have collected a consistent number of definitions, I will now proceed to 
the comparison between expert writers‟ use of clearly and student writers‟ use of this 
booster. I noticed that this booster is used both by students and expert writers of my 
                                                          
8
 Here is the link for clearly: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/clearly. 
9
 Here is the link for clearly: https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/clearly. 
10
 Here is the link for clearly: https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/clearly. 
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corpus, but more used by experts. As with the hedge according to, I will look for these 
three points: 
- examples of clearly exactly used in the same way of expert writers; 
- examples of clearly that are actually mistakes in the students‟ corpus 
- examples of clearly differently used than expert writers but not grammatically incorrect. 
As regards the first point, I noticed that some of the examples of clearly in the NNS 
corpus come from quotations: this may be the reason why they are less numerous (as 
already mentioned in my thesis, I did not consider hedges and boosters that came from 
quotations). In any case, here are the examples that are similar to those of expert writers 
(not considering quotations): 
On the opposite side there are many advantages and disadvantages that can be 
distinguished in more concrete and immediate ones and potential and future ones, and 
they are both clearly identified by Baker (1995: 10-12; 1998: 6, 7). 
 
[…] as Baker (1995:10 ) claims that “bilingualism is more than owning two 
languages”. However, it comes clearly to light that it is a widespread phenomenon, 
which involves “more than half the world‟ […] 
 
 […] the parents have to deal with a strenuous task, but the reward for these efforts 
clearly brings more advantages than disadvantages for what concern bilingual 
children. 
 
Therefore, the more competence you have, the better it is, and this is clearly one of the 
biggest advantages of being bilingual […] 
 
To conclude, as this essay clearly shows there are more advantages than disadvantages 
in raising a bilingual child. 
 
Over the last two centuries the number of children grown up as bilingual has been 
significantly increased and will probably keep on rising in future. One of the main 
reasons is the internationalization, that we are clearly experimenting in this century 
[…] 
Fourthly, it has been clearly proven that a wider portfolio of languages facilitates the 
access to the labour market […] 
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To conclude, this essay clearly shows that there are much more advantages than 
disadvantages in raising a bilingual child. 
 
Furthermore, research has proved that bilingual children are more creative and tend to 
have a more flexible mind; they clearly own this sort of “advantages” since they are 
able to think in two different manners, associating two words to the same concept or 
object. 
 
 Table 14: Examples of clearly used in the same way of expert writers 
 
As regards the second point, I noticed just one mistake in the use of clearly by students, 
namely *a clearly instead of a clear:  
*A clearly definition of bilingualism is difficult to be found, however Spolsky affirms 
that “the simplest definition of a bilingual is a person who has some functional ability 
in a second language” (1998: 45). 
 
Table 15: Example of clearly that is actually a mistake 
 
As regards the third point, I noticed that expert writers used clearly at the beginning of 
some sentences, which I did not see in the students‟ sentences. Here are the examples I 
found: 
Clearly,  psycholinguistics models will have to be very detailed to account for such on-
line bilingual contact phenomena. 
 
Clearly, and not too surprisingly, texts that contained interferences gave bilinguals no 
problems […] 
 
Clearly  interferences  such  as  „partitures‟,  „autogramme‟, „dressure‟ and „prognose‟ 
slowed both groups down. 
Clearly,  definitions of biculturalism will have to leave open the fact that some people 
do indeed take part in the life of more than two cultures and that they adapt to each of 
these cultures, as well as combine and blend aspects of several cultures. 
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Table 16: Examples of clearly at the beginning of sentences in the expert writers‟ 
corpus 
 
I also have decided to look at the common patterns of two hedges, namely could and 
should,  in both the NNS corpus and the expert writers‟ corpus, and to compare their 
use. The results for NNS are provided in Table 17 and Table 18. 
 
Common 
patterns of 
could in NNS 
corpus 
Example(s) 
could affect (5 
instances) 
 However, there seem to be also some potential problems 
that could affect bilingual children. 
could be (74 
instances) 
bilingualism could be a problem for children‟s learning; 
this process could be challenging; every type of support 
could be important. 
could cause (8 
instances) 
For many, identity is not a problem but it could cause 
confusion. 
could face (6 
instances) 
what could be the main advantages they can gain and the 
main challenges parents could face? 
could feel (4 
instances) 
They could feel rejected as human beings by the society 
too. 
could find (6 
instances) 
[…] they could find difficult to speak one language only 
could have (19 
instances) 
it would seem that a bilingual could have a more opened 
mind; they could have an identity crisis; this may indicate 
that they could have more opportunities in their life; on 
the contrary, children could have some problems also at 
school. 
could lead (7 
instances) 
achieving biculturalism through bilingualism could lead 
to identity struggles. 
could not (5 
istances) 
 He/She could not manage the situation. 
Table 17: Common patterns of could in NNS corpus 
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Common patterns of should 
in NNS corpus 
Example(s) 
should be (50 instances): 
aware of (4 instances); 
considered (6 instances) 
parents should be aware of the great 
possibilities given by bilingualism; it should 
be considered also the learning speed. 
should consider (3 instances) we should also consider the complex 
phenomena of bilingualism. 
should encourage (6 
instances) 
Teachers should encourage home language 
in school as equally important. 
should have (4 instances) Discussions are open especially in regard of 
the linguistic level that a bilingual should 
have. 
should help (3 instances) Adults should help children to accept 
another language. 
should not (17 instances) They should not expect too much too soon 
from him/her. 
should support (3 instances) […] parents should support their children. 
should try (4 instances)  They should try not to point out the mistakes 
but to expand and to improve child‟s attempt 
to communicate. 
Table 18: Common patterns of should in NNS corpus 
 
Here, instead, in Table 19 and Table 20 I provide the results for the expert writers‟ 
corpus. 
 
Common patterns of 
could in the expert 
writers‟ corpus 
Example(s) 
could be (29 
instances): expected (3 
instances); observed (2 
instances); predicted (2 
[…] differences between the emotionality of L1 
and L2 could be expected if L2 has been learnt 
later; […] an asymmetric distribution could be 
observed; It could be predicted that L1 words are 
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instances) likely to activate the semantic system to a greater 
extent […]. 
could explain (2 
instances) 
The bilingual participants studied were dominant 
in L2, which could explain why emotional arousal 
associated with the prime words was accessed 
rapidly […] 
could have been (4 
instances) 
Because of this, it could have been introduced at 
the start of this paper but it was important to 
discuss other aspects […] 
could indicate (3 
instances) 
This finding could indicate that interpreters have 
better executive control of language than non-
interpreters. 
one could use (2 
instances) 
Since presence and acceptability judgements [sic] 
give similar results, one could use either approach 
to decide whether one is dealing with a transfer 
(the value word to be high) or an interference (the 
value would need to be low) 
some/it could well (2 
instances) 
It could well be described as “talk between…two 
monolinguals who speak different languages but 
nevertheless understand one another”, thanks to 
the help of a bilingual intermediary. 
Table 19: Common patterns of could in the expert writers‟ corpus 
 
 Common patterns of 
should in the expert 
writers‟ corpus 
 
Example(s) 
should be (33 instances): 
done (2 instances); 
emphasized (2 
instances); found (2 
instances); mentioned (2 
instances); noted (5 
instances) 
“because this is how it should be done, isn‟t 
it?”; It should be emphasized that inferences 
can be seen as mental activations in multilingual 
communication; If this is indeed the case, 
positive significant correlations should be found 
between D-values for both languages among the 
Brussels group, but not among the Paris group;  
Given the two approaches, it should be 
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mentioned that in addition to the processes 
discussed, a whole range of discursive 
components comes into play […]); It should be 
noted finally that both types of deviations, 
although sometimes quite apparent (such as a 
foreign accent), usually do not interfere with 
communication. 
should have (2 instances)  it is desirable that we should have an 
understanding of the circumstances […] 
should recall (2 
instances)  
[…] participants should recall the word 
“miner” because “miner” followed “apple” in 
the stimulus list. 
should test (2 instances)  Further research should test this hypothesis. 
should therefore be (2 
instances)  
The creation and implementation of guidelines 
for L1 use in young language learners‟ 
classrooms should therefore be perceived as a 
joint collaborative endeavor […] 
Table 20: Common patterns of should in the expert writers‟ corpus 
 
If we look at the patterns of could,  we can notice that there are some similarities but 
generally more differences in the patterns used by NNS and expert writers, respectively. 
As concerns similarities, we find the very frequent use of could be in both corpora, 
although we have 74 instances in the NNS corpus and just 29 in the expert writers‟ 
corpus; moreover, whereas I found a more general use of could be in the NNS corpus, in 
the expert writers‟ corpus we can find could be expected, could be observed and could 
be predicted (although, as the numbers above indicate, they are not so much frequent). 
We also find the very frequent use of could have in the NNS corpus (19 instances), 
whereas expert writers used could have been (although not so frequently: we have only 
4 instances). 
As concerns differences, we have patterns that are used by NNS and not by 
expert writers, and vice versa: could affect, could cause, could face, could feel, could 
find, could lead and could not used by NNS; could explain, could indicate, one could 
use, some/it could well used by expert writers. Once again, the patterns used by expert 
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writers are less numerous than those used by NNS (we have from 2 to 3 instances for 
each of the patterns just mentioned).  
If we look at the patterns of should, once again we notice that there are some 
similarities but generally more differences in the patterns used by NNS and expert 
writers, respectively. As concerns similarities, we find the very frequent use of should 
be in both corpora, although what follows this pattern is different: aware of and 
considered in the NNS corpus; done, emphasized, found, mentioned, and noted in the 
expert writers‟ corpus. 
As concerns differences, once again we have patterns that are used by NNS and 
not by expert writers, and vice versa: should consider, should encourage, should help, 
should not, should support, should try used by NNS; should recall, should test, should 
therefore be used by expert writers. Once again, the patterns used by expert writers are 
less numerous than those used by NNS (we have just 2 instances for each of the patterns 
just mentioned).  
One final note: the sentences used by expert writers are generally longer and/or 
more complex than those used by NNS (see, for instance, the last sentence about should 
in the expert writers‟ corpus, where the subject is The creation and implementation of 
guidelines for L1 use in young language learners‟ classrooms). 
We can also finally reply to the third research question: 3a+3b) As Hyland and 
Milton (1997) argue, are the expressions of doubt and certainty (i.e. hedges and 
boosters, respectively) difficult to master for non-native speakers of English (in our 
case, for Italian students of English)? And if so, is this a culture-related phenomenon? 
From the analysis I have conducted, it seems that these students generally have few 
difficulties in mastering hedges and boosters. We have, however, seen with the analysis 
of according to and clearly that sometimes students commit errors when they use these 
epistemic devices (i.e. the use of according to when referring to one own‟s opinion, or 
of *a clearly instead of a clear, although this last mistake is probably due to an 
oversight), and there could be other mistakes that went unnoticed.  
What is striking, in any case, is that if we look again at the total number of 
hedges and boosters used both by NNS and expert writers, we can see that the total of 
hedges found in the NNS corpus is more than the double that found in the expert 
writers‟ corpus (782 as compared to 1,579). This is partially in line with Hyland‟s 
(2001) study, which found that, in his corpus of academic writing, hedges exceeded 
boosters by nearly 3 to 1. According to this author, as we have seen in chapter 2, this 
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reflects the need for claims to be presented provisionally in academic argument. It does 
not appear to be true, therefore, that NNS academic prose contains fewer hedging 
devices than that of NS writers, as stated by Hinkel (2005) and other authors (although I 
must point out that we are comparing NNS and expert writers‟ academic writing). As 
regards boosters, however, we can see that the total of these devices in the NNS corpus 
slightly exceeds that of the expert writers‟ corpus (193 as compared to 140), although, 
as I have just pointed out, the difference is minimal. 
All of this could suggest that, as stated by Hyland (2000), there actually are 
cross-cultural differences in expressing doubt and certainty, that is, while academic 
writing in German, for instance, seems to be more direct than in English (as suggested 
by the same author), Italian students generally tend to be more cautious. It could also be 
that, by being university third-year-students, these students are more aware of the rules 
that regulate academic writing, including the use of hedges and boosters. Indeed, 
Seškauskiène (2008) affirms both that, when acquiring a new language, many NNS also 
acquire many of its textual and metadiscoursal features, including hedges and boosters, 
and that hedging in L2 of proficient users of English is not less frequent than the 
average frequency of hedging in the papers of competent users of English. 
Going into a deeper analysis, we can look again at Table 5 and Table 9, which 
report, respectively, the five most commonly used hedges by NNS students and by 
expert writers of English. It seems not to be true that L2 writers appear to depend far 
more heavily on modal verbs than NS, as stated by Hyland and Milton (1997). Indeed, 
Table 5 includes four modal verbs out of the five most commonly used hedges (i.e. can, 
may, could and should), whereas Table 9 includes all modal verbs (can, may, would, 
could and should)! 
Once again, Hyland and Milton (1997) point out to the popularity of adverbs 
over semantically equivalent verb forms in L2 writing, but if we look at Table 3 (i.e. 
number of hits, hedges, and percentage in the NNS corpus) we can notice that adverbs 
are present in very small percentage (e.g. approximately= 0.06%, generally= 1.39%), 
when they are not absent at all (e.g. essentially and possibly). The very small frequency 
of adverbs may be related to what Hinkel (2005) affirms, that is, that the types of hedges 
in L2 academic writing are limited to those that are associated with casual spoken 
interactions. Indeed, while we find few adverbs or particular expressions such as one 
implication of my research (which is absent at all in the NNS corpus), we have seen 
above the popularity of modal verbs such as can, which is very used in conversation. 
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Instead, in her study Serholt (2012) affirmed that the modal verbs might, could 
and may appeared to be the most frequently used hedges by Swedish learners of 
English: in our case might is absent from Table 5 (but it could have been present if I had 
considered the ten most frequently used hedges by NNS), whereas we have seen that 
may and could are, respectively, at the second and third place of this Table. 
Finally, Chunyu and Xuyan (2015) affirm that form complexity determines 
which items learners prefer so that, for instance, students will prefer, between probably 
and maybe, the less complex maybe: once again, this is not true in our case, since 
probably has a frequency percentage of 1.27%, whereas maybe has a frequency 
percentage of just 0.38% (see Table 3). This also leads us to the final point stated by the 
two authors, that is that when, for instance, maybe becomes the dominant form to mark 
epistemic possibility, other devices such as perhaps, possibly and probably become less 
significant: once again, this is not true in our case, since as, apart from the absent 
possibly, both maybe and perhaps have a frequency percentage of 0.38%, while the 
frequency percentage of probably is even of 1.27%. 
As regards the implications for teaching academic writing related to hedges 
and boosters, I noticed that, while on the web one can find several articles related to the 
use of hedges and boosters (but especially related to hedges), I had more difficulties in 
finding textbooks that explain how to use these epistemic devices. Indeed, during my 
research for chapter 2, I found just one book out of four, namely Candlin, Crompton and 
Hatim‟s Academic Writing Step by Step: A Research-based Approach (2016), which 
devotes a very small number of pages (just two) to the use of modal verbs to indicate 
degrees of certainty and to the importance of hedging in popularized RAs, but no 
mention is made to the use of boosters. It is necessary that all the books devoted to 
academic writing deal with hedges and boosters, since we have seen the importance of 
these devices in chapter 2, and also that teachers introduce these topics when they teach 
how to write in academic English (or whatsoever language). Moreover, when writing 
chapter 2 of my thesis, I noticed that the focus of most studies is on hedges, whereas 
only few studies deal with boosters. As we have seen in that chapter, hedges are 
necessary to indicate the speaker‟s uncertainty about what they argue, but I believe that 
an overuse of hedges can be deleterious: indeed, it could give the idea that the writer is 
not sure about anything they state, either because they want to avoid full responsibility 
for the statement in utterance or because they do not have any reliable data. 
Consequently, they would fail in their argumentation. This is why I believe that not only 
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hedges but also boosters should be taught to university students learning how to write in 
academic English. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
CONCLUSION 
As I stated in the introduction, with this thesis I wanted to deal with modality, especially 
with modality in academic writing. More specifically, my goals were: to provide an 
overview of modality and modal auxiliaries; to focus on modality in academic writing, 
in particular on the concepts of hedges and boosters; and finally, to investigate how 
hedges and boosters are used by NNS of English and to compare this use with that of 
expert writers. 
I believe these goals have been achieved to a great extent. In chapter 1, 
together with the notion of assertion, proposition, proposal and polarity, I have 
introduced the definition of mood proposed by Leech (2006) and compared it with that 
of a different kind of Mood proposed both by Halliday (2004) and Eggins (2004), 
namely the Mood structure of the clause. Then, I have taken a look at how scholars such 
as Palmer (2001) classify modality in modal systems. We have, indeed, seen that 
modality can be classified into two types, namely propositional and event modality, but 
that further categorizations are possible, whereas other authors, for instance Biber et al. 
(1999), group modals and semi-modals into three categories according to their 
meanings, that is: permission/possibility/ability; obligation/necessity; and 
volition/prediction. Finally, before comparing Palmer‟s (2001) classification with that 
of Coates (1983), we have seen another type of modality, namely the past tense as a 
modal (other types of modality are present too but, for reasons of space, I had to limit 
the discussion only to this type of modality). Then, I have introduced an alternative 
classification of modality proposed by Coates (1983), a classification that may seem 
simpler than that by Palmer (2001) because it just distinguishes between epistemic and 
root modality, but it is only apparently so for at least two reasons: the first is that we 
have seen how many other concepts are involved, such as that of core, skirt and 
periphery, and the second is that we have seen how, for each modal, generally more 
meanings are present (e.g. should has a Root meaning, an Epistemic meaning, it 
sometimes functions as a quasi-subjunctive, and finally it also supplies a first-person 
variant for hypothetical would). 
In chapter 2, as stated above, I have analyzed modality in academic writing. 
We have seen, for instance with Piqué-Angordans et al. (2001), that different disciplines 
favour different types of modality. Then, I have focused my analysis on hedges and 
boosters. We have seen how hedges are central to academic writing because they make 
sentences more acceptable to the reader by expressing indeterminacy and increase their 
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chances of ratification. However, we have also seen how boosters, although much less 
frequently used than hedges (and also less studied, I would add, as the presence of more 
studies about hedges than about boosters in my thesis would suggest), are important in 
academic writing. They are used, indeed, when authors are sure about what they state, 
and so they indicate strong persuasion and also show engagement and solidarity with 
the audience. After this explanation, I have focused my attention on two topics: hedges 
and boosters in NS academic writing and corpora, and hedges and boosters in learners‟ 
academic writing. As regards the first topic, we have seen with Hyland (2001) that 
different types of knowledge favour a different use of hedges and boosters: indeed, this 
author stated that over 70% of all hedges occurred in the humanities/social science 
papers because in the soft fields the research cannot be reported with the same 
confidence as shared assumptions since as soft-knowledge areas are more interpretative 
and less abstract compared to hard-knowledge areas. As regards the second point, we 
have seen that most authors, such as Hyland (2000), Hyland and Milton (1997) and 
Hsin-I (2010), argued that the expressions of doubt and certainty (i.e. hedges and 
boosters, respectively) are difficult to master for NNS of English (although Hsin-I 2010 
also added that, with increasing proficiency, the NNS writers perform more like the NS 
writers). 
It is for this reason that in chapter 3 I have attempted to see how hedges and 
boosters are used by NNS of English and to compare this use with that of expert writers. 
My research questions were the following: 1a+1b) Do ESL learners (in our case, Italian 
students of English) use more hedges or boosters in academic writing? And compared to 
expert writers?; 2a+2b+2c+2d) What are the five most commonly used hedges in 
academic writing by these students? What are the five most commonly used boosters in 
academic writing by these students? What are the five most commonly used hedges in 
academic writing by expert writers? What are the five most commonly used boosters in 
academic writing by expert writers?; 3a+3b) As Hyland and Milton (1997) argue, are 
the expressions of doubt and certainty (i.e. hedges and boosters, respectively) difficult 
to master for non-native speakers of English (in our case, for Italian students of 
English)? And if so, is this a culture-related phenomenon? Surprisingly enough, by 
preparing tables for both NNS of English and expert writers, I have discovered that the 
total of hedges found in the NNS corpus was more than the double that found in the first 
eleven journal articles of the expert writers‟ corpus (1,579 as compared to 782), whereas 
the total of boosters found in the NNS corpus was pretty similar to that found in the 
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expert writers‟ corpus (193 as compared to 140). The normalized frequency per 10,000 
words is: of 208 hedges in the NNS corpus and of 25 boosters in the NNS corpus; in the 
expert writers‟ corpus, it is of 61 hedges and of 11 boosters. 
Moreover, I have found out that, while the most commonly used hedges by 
NNS students and the most commonly used hedges by expert writers were more or less 
the same (i.e. can, may, could, according to and should for NNS; can, may, would, 
could and should for expert writers), there were differences as regards the most 
commonly used boosters (i.e. indeed, must, the fact that, strongly and surely for NNS; 
must, the fact that, clearly, indeed, and always for expert writers). 
To provide a more qualitative analysis, I also focused my attention on one 
hedge and one booster, namely according to (which was frequently used by NNS and 
not present in the five most commonly used hedges by expert writers) and clearly 
(which, on the other hand, was present among the most commonly used boosters by 
expert writers but absent among the five most commonly used boosters by NNS). I have 
made a comparison between the learners‟ corpus and the expert writers‟ corpus by 
dividing examples of according to and clearly in the NNS corpus into three categories: 
examples of according to and clearly exactly used in the same ways of expert writers; 
examples of according to and clearly that are actually mistakes; and examples of 
according to and clearly differently used than expert writers but not grammatically 
incorrect.  
As regards according to, my analysis has revealed that most examples are used 
in the same way as expert writers, that there were three mistakes in the use of this 
hedge, and that, while there were no examples of according to used differently from 
expert writers, most examples of this hedge in the expert writers‟ corpus looked more 
complex from those of the NNS corpus. As regards clearly, I have noticed that some of 
the examples of this booster in the NNS corpus came from quotations: this may be the 
reason why they are less numerous than in the expert writers‟ corpus. In any case, my 
analysis revealed that there were eight examples of this booster used in the same way as 
expert writers, that one student wrote *a clearly instead of a clear, and that expert 
writers sometimes used clearly at the beginning of their sentences, which I did not see 
in the students‟ sentences. After this analysis, I looked at the common patterns of two 
hedges, that is could and should, in both the NNS corpus and the expert writers‟ corpus, 
and compared their use. The analysis has revealed some similarities in both cases (i.e. in 
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the case of could and should), but generally more differences since I have found 
patterns that were used by NNS and not by expert writers and vice versa. 
As concerns the research questions 3a+3b, I have already partially addressed 
them above when I have affirmed that the total of hedges found in the NNS corpus was 
more than the double of that found in the expert writers‟ corpus. I have advanced some 
hypotheses about this result, namely that there could be cross-cultural differences in 
expressing doubt and certainty, that is, while academic writing in German, for instance, 
seems to be more direct than in English (as suggested by Hyland 2000), Italian students 
generally tend to be more cautious. Moreover, it may well be that, by being university 
third-year-students, these students are more aware of the rules that regulate academic 
writing, including the use of hedges and boosters. All of these are just hypotheses, as I 
stated above, and further research is needed to confirm or contradict these opinions. 
In my thesis I also have contradicted the results of other scholars as well, for 
instance those Hyland and Milton (1997), who stated that L2 writers appeared to depend 
far more heavily on modal verbs than NS: this appears not to be entirely true since the 
Table of the five most commonly used hedges by NNS included four modal verbs, but 
that of expert writers included all modal verbs. Finally, I have suggested some 
implications for teaching academic writing related to hedges and boosters. I talked 
about the difficulties in finding academic text books that devote space to the use of 
these epistemic devices, and I pointed out that teachers should introduce these topics 
when they teach how to write in academic English. In any case, I concluded chapter 3 
with the note that, in my opinion, even an overuse of hedges could be deleterious 
because it could give the idea that the writer is not sure about anything he/she states. 
Consequently, I believe that hedges and boosters should be equally treated when 
teaching them to university students, and I would suggest that, in the future, more 
studies should be devoted also to the use of boosters (as I have mentioned above, most 
of the studies I found focused on hedges). Nevertheless, I hope that, with this thesis, I 
have contributed to a greater understanding of the use of hedges and boosters by 
learners and by expert writers.  
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RIASSUNTO DELLA TESI 
Questa tesi si occupa della modalità e dei verbi modali e, specialmente, della modalità 
nella scrittura accademica. Gli obiettivi di questa tesi sono: fornire una panoramica della 
modalità e degli ausiliari modali (capitolo 1); porre l‟attenzione sulla modalità nella 
scrittura accademica e, in particolare, sui concetti di hedges e boosters (ovvero due 
categorie della modalità epistemica, capitolo 2); infine, indagare su come gli hedges e i 
boosters sono usati dai non-nativi inglesi e confrontare questo uso con quello degli 
scrittori esperti. 
La tesi inizia con un‟introduzione ai vari capitoli, mentre nel capitolo 1 si parla 
della classificazione della modalità secondo autori come Palmer (2001) e poi la si 
confronta con quella di Coates (1983). Palmer (2001) sostiene che ci siano due tipi di 
modalità: la modalità proposizionale e la modalità evento. Ognuna di queste può essere 
suddivisa in due ulteriori categorie: epistemica e probatoria per quanto riguarda la 
prima; deontica e dinamica per quanto riguarda la seconda. Riguardo alla modalità 
epistemica, Palmer (2001) spiega che ci sono tre tipi di giudizio comuni nelle lingue: il 
primo esprime incertezza, il secondo indica una deduzione da prove osservabili, e il 
terzo indica deduzione da ciò che è generalmente noto (ovvero, rispettivamente: 
giudizio speculativo, deduttivo e ipotetico). Per quanto riguarda la modalità probatoria, 
l‟autore sostiene che vi siano solo due tipi di vere e proprie categorie probatorie, ovvero 
“riferito” e “sensoriale”. La categoria sensoriale riguarda lingue diverse dall‟inglese, 
come il tuyuca (Brasile e Colombia), dove troviamo categorie etichettate come “visivo”, 
“non visivo”, “apparente”, “di seconda mano” e “presunto”. Per quanto concerne il 
“riferito”, Palmer (2001) spiega che, per alcune lingue, è necessario riconoscere tre 
sottocategorie: prova di seconda mano (colui che parla dice di aver sentito della 
situazione descritta da qualcuno che ne è stato testimone diretto); prova di terza mano 
(colui che parla dice di aver sentito della situazione descritta ma non da un testimone 
diretto) e prova dal folklore (colui che parla dice che la situazione descritta fa parte 
della storia orale ufficiale). 
Passando alla modalità evento e alle sue sottocategorie, per Palmer (2001) la 
modalità deontica si collega all‟obbligo o al permesso che viene dato da una fonte 
esterna, mentre la modalità dinamica si collega all‟abilità o alla volontà che deriva 
dall‟individuo in questione. I più comuni tipi di modalità deontica sono le “direttive”, 
cioè “dove cerchiamo di far fare delle cose agli altri” (Searle 1983:166, citato in Palmer 
2001) e le “commissive”, “dove ci impegniamo a fare delle cose” (Searle 1983:166, 
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citato in Palmer 2001). Infine, tornando alla modalità dinamica, come già visto abbiamo 
due tipi che esprimono abilità e volontà e che, in inglese, sono espresse rispettivamente 
da can e will. Va sottolineato, in ultima istanza, che, secondo Palmer (2001), vi sono 
altri tipi di modalità, come il passato usato come un verbo modale: infatti l‟autore 
sottolinea che le forme passate possono essere usate per esprimere irrealtà, incertezza, 
potenzialità ecc. 
Come già detto sopra, Coates (1983) propone una classificazione della 
modalità alternativa a quella di Palmer (2001), distinguendo tra modalità epistemica e 
non-epistemica. Epistemico è un termine che deriva dal greco episteme (“conoscenza”) 
ed ha a che fare con questioni di conoscenza e di “credo”, mentre la modalità non-
epistemica si occupa di obbligo, permesso, abilità ecc. Secondo Coates (1983) e anche 
Palmer (2001), la modalità epistemica indica la fiducia (o la mancanza di fiducia) di 
colui che parla nella verità della proposizione espressa. Coates (1983) spiega anche che 
i verbi modali relativi alle ipotesi sono must, should e ought, mentre quelli relativi ad 
una determinazione delle possibilità sono may, might e could. Per quanto riguarda la 
modalità non-epistemica, Coates (1983) chiama questa modalità “root” e non adotta il 
termine “deontico” che le appare inappropriato dato che si riferisce alla logica 
dell‟obbligo e del permesso, mentre – aggiunge lei – tipici verbi modali come must e 
may coprono una gamma di significati, dei quali obbligo e permesso rappresentano solo 
il nocciolo. 
Prima di analizzare gli ausiliari modali, Coates (1983) ne evidenzia le seguenti 
caratteristiche: prendono la negazione direttamente (can‟t, mustn‟t); fanno l‟inversione 
senza l‟ausiliare do (can I? must I?); “Codice” (John can swim and so can Bill); Enfasi 
(Ann COULD solve the problem); non prendono la s alla terza persona singolare (*cans, 
*musts); non hanno forme infinite (*to can, *musting), e, infine, non co-occorrono. 
Nonostante la distinzione tra modalità epistemica e non-epistemica, per motivi 
di comodità l‟autrice suddivide i vari verbi modali in categorie riguardanti il loro 
significato: i modali di obbligo (must, need, should e ought); i modali di abilità e 
possibilità (can e could); i modali di possibilità epistemica (may, might e could 
epistemico); i modali di volontà e predizione (will e shall) e, infine, i modali ipotetici 
(would e should e suo significato epistemico). 
Il capitolo 2, come già menzionato, si occupa specificamente della modalità 
nella scrittura accademica. Per quanto riguarda la modalità nella scrittura accademica 
degli esperti, Piqué-Angordans e altri (2001) hanno scoperto, analizzando il linguaggio 
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di tre diversi contesti accademici e professionali, che discipline diverse prediligono 
diversi tipi di modalità, mentre Candlin, Crompton e Hatim (2016) si sono soffermati 
sull‟uso dei verbi modali per indicare diversi gradi di certezza e sull‟importanza 
dell‟hedging, concludendo che “ i ricercatori usano l‟ hedging per mostrare che le loro 
affermazioni non sono basate sulla conoscenza certa ma sul ragionamento che deriva 
dalle prove che hanno” (Candlin, Crompton e Hatim 2016: 8); infine Gruber (2005) ha 
affermato che “l‟interpretazione di modelli certi di uso delle costruzioni modali deve 
tener conto della cultura disciplinare” (Gruber 2005: 47). 
In seguito, vengono spiegati i concetti di hedges e boosters. Questi concetti 
sono collegati alla modalità epistemica e sono centrali nella scrittura accademica. 
Infatti, in sintesi, gli hedges sono usati quando gli autori hanno bisogno di esprimere 
indeterminatezza, rendere le frasi più accettabili per il lettore e, quindi, aumentare la 
loro possibilità di ratifica, mentre i boosters, come afferma Hyland (1998), “permettono 
agli scrittori di esprimere convinzione e sostenere una proposizione con fiducia, 
rappresentando una forte dichiarazione riguardo uno stato d‟affari” (Hyland 1998: 2). 
Nel secondo capitolo viene fornita anche la revisione della letteratura relativa 
ai più recenti (e meno recenti) articoli collegati agli hedges e ai boosters nella scrittura 
accademica dei discenti e in quella degli inglesi parlanti nativi. A titolo d‟esempio, sia 
Hyland (2000) che Hyland e Milton (1997) sottolineano il fatto che gli studenti di 
inglese L2 hanno difficoltà ad utilizzare questi espedienti epistemici, e anche Hinkel 
(2005) sottolinea come, dal suo studio, risulti che la prosa accademica dei non-parlanti 
nativi contenga meno hedges rispetto a quella dei parlanti nativi. Hsin-I (2010), invece, 
ha scoperto che, con la crescita delle loro conoscenze, i non-parlanti nativi hanno una 
performance più simile ai parlanti nativi per quanto riguarda l‟uso degli espedienti 
epistemici. Serholt (2012), d‟altra parte, ha analizzato la frequenza complessiva in cui 
degli studenti svedesi che imparano l‟inglese utilizzano la modalità epistemica per 
esprimere dubbio (hedges) e certezza (boosters) nella loro scrittura accademica e si è 
chiesta se ci sono differenze collegate al genere degli studenti. L‟analisi ha rivelato che 
questi studenti utilizzano gli hedges con più frequenza dei boosters indipendentemente 
dal genere e che questi ultimi non sono usati in maniera eccessiva. 
Per quanto riguarda, invece, l‟uso degli hedges e dei boosters nella scrittura 
accademica dei parlanti nativi, Hyland (2001) ha esaminato il loro uso in un corpus di 
articoli relativi a discipline diverse e ha riportato che le scienze “soft” usano più hedges 
rispetto alle scienze “hard”, e questo perché i settori della conoscenza “soft” sono più 
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interpretativi e meno astratti e, perciò, i dati vanno espressi con più cautela usando più 
hedges. Vàsquez e Giner (2009), invece, si sono concentrati specificamente sui boosters 
analizzando articoli selezionati da tre discipline (marketing, biologia e ingegneria 
meccanica). Il loro studio ha provato che la quantità di boosters nell‟area marketing 
sembra essere il doppio di quella trovata nella biologia e nell‟ingegneria meccanica. I 
due autori hanno spiegato questo risultato argomentando che i dati inclusi negli articoli 
di marketing non sono molto precisi, ma piuttosto basati sulla speculazione. Di 
conseguenza, vi è la necessità dell‟uso dei boosters per rafforzare quanto affermato. 
Infine, Kim e Lim (2015) hanno esplorato le realizzazioni linguistiche degli hedges 
nella scrittura accademica e concluso che l‟hedging è una caratteristica saliente del 
discorso accademico e che il suo uso appropriato è centrale nel processo di valutazione 
dei fatti e delle stime, che è il fulcro della scrittura accademica. 
Nel capitolo terzo, il più importante della tesi, vengono confrontati due 
corpora, ovvero un corpus di 136 saggi brevi scritti in inglese da non-parlanti nativi e un 
corpus di 20 articoli accademici scritti in inglese da scrittori esperti. Il tema di questi 
corpora è il bilinguismo. Più specificamente, il mio obiettivo, tra gli altri, era quello di 
rispondere alle seguenti domande di ricerca: 1a+1b) gli studenti di una lingua straniera 
(nel nostro caso, studenti italiani che studiano l‟inglese) usano più hedges o boosters 
nella scrittura accademica? E in confronto con gli scrittori inglesi esperti?; 
2a+2b+2c+2d) quali sono i cinque hedges più usati da questi studenti nella scrittura 
accademica? quali sono i cinque boosters più usati da questi studenti nella scrittura 
accademica? quali sono i cinque hedges più usati dagli scrittori esperti nella scrittura 
accademica? quali sono i cinque boosters più usati dagli scrittori esperti nella scrittura 
accademica?; e 3a+3b) come Hyland e Milton (1997) sostengono, le espressioni di 
dubbio e di certezza (gli hedges e i boosters, rispettivamente) sono difficili da 
padroneggiare per i non-parlanti nativi di inglese? E se sì, è un fenomeno collegato alla 
cultura? 
Ovviamente ho preparato, rispettivamente, una lista degli hedges e dei boosters 
da utilizzare nella mia analisi. La lista degli hedges include i seguenti elementi: may, 
would, possible/possibly, the possibility that, could, might, can, try, attempt, think, 
believe, according to, normally, essentially, hypothesize, speculate, assume, suggest, 
indicate, propose, seem, assumption, about, probable, probably, presumably, usually, 
rarely, virtually, as much as, it is unlikely/likely, perhaps, it appears that, apparently, 
should, partially, one implication of my research, it is unclear, approximately, 
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generally, quite, e maybe (per un totale di 44 hedges esaminati). La lista dei boosters, 
invece, include: must, the fact that, research shows that, it is clear, clearly, surely, 
definitely, strongly, actually, it is evident that, indeed, always, obviously, one obvious 
implication, of course, demonstrate, highly, it is generally believed, and it is 
undoubtedly (per un totale di 19 boosters esaminati). Il totale degli hedges trovati nel 
corpus degli studenti è 1579 mentre quello dei boosters è 193; il totale degli hedges 
trovati nei primi undici articoli del corpus degli scrittori esperti è 782 mentre quello dei 
boosters è 140. 
Per l‟analisi di entrambi i corpora ho usato il software per le concordanze 
AntConc che è scaricabile gratuitamente dal sito del Professore Laurence Anthony 
(http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc). Ho usato il pulsante delle 
concordanze per vedere ogni hedge e booster nel suo contesto, in modo da decidere se 
quell‟elemento fosse veramente un hedge o un  booster (ad es. nel corpus degli studenti 
l‟hedge about è usato 129 volte ma solo 1 volta con il significato di “circa”, e ho 
considerato questo unico esempio come vero hedge in quanto approssimatore, mentre le 
altre volte about era usato per introdurre un complemento di specificazione); inoltre, ho 
controllato che questi hedges e boosters non fossero inseriti nelle citazioni di altri autori 
in modo da fornire solo esempi relativi agli studenti italiani, nel caso del primo corpus, 
o agli scrittori esperti, nel caso del secondo. 
Tornando alle domande di ricerca, la risposta alla prima domanda è che sembra 
che questi studenti usino molti più hedges che boosters nella scrittura accademica 
(come abbiamo visto qui sopra quando ho riportato i rispettivi totali dei due corpora), 
mentre per quanto riguarda le risposte alle domande 2a e 2b si può dire che i cinque 
hedges più usati da questi studenti sono i seguenti: can, may, could, according to e 
should, mentre i cinque boosters più usati sono: indeed, must, the fact that, strong e 
surely. La risposta alle domande 2c e 2d è che i cinque hedges e i cinque boosters più 
usati dagli scrittori esperti sono, rispettivamente: can, may, would, could e should 
(hedges); must, the fact that, clearly, indeed e always (boosters). 
Prima di rispondere alla terza domanda di ricerca ho fornito un‟analisi più 
qualitativa guardando a come un hedge e un booster ( rispettivamente, according to e 
clearly) sono usati nei due corpora. Più specificamente, ho cercato nel corpus degli 
studenti: esempi di according to (e poi di clearly) che rappresentano esempi usati allo 
stesso modo degli scrittori esperti; esempi di according to (e poi di clearly) che sono 
errori; infine, esempi di according to (e poi di clearly) usati differentemente dagli 
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scrittori esperti ma che non rappresentano errori. Per quanto riguarda according to, 
l‟analisi ha rilevato che: la maggior parte degli esempi sono usati allo stesso modo degli 
scrittori esperti; vi sono due errori nell‟uso di according to, ovvero l‟uso di *according 
to me e di *according to my point of view; non vi sono esempi di according to usati 
differentemente dagli scrittori esperti, e così ho deciso di riportare esempi tratti dal 
corpus degli scrittori esperti che sembrano più complessi di quelli degli studenti. Nel 
caso di clearly, l‟analisi ha rilevato che: anche in questo caso, buona parte degli esempi 
rispecchiano il modo di scrivere degli scrittori esperti; vi è un unico errore (*a clearly 
anziché a clear); e che gli scrittori esperti, a volte, usano clearly all‟inizio delle loro 
frasi, cosa che non ho notato nelle frasi degli studenti. Inoltre, sia per according to che 
per clearly, ho riportato le rispettive definizioni tratte sia da dizionari cartacei che online 
e da una grammatica. 
Dopo questa procedura, ho anche trovato i modelli comuni di due hedges 
(could e should) in entrambi i corpora per confrontare il loro uso. Ne è risultato che vi 
sono alcune similarità ma, generalmente, più differenze tra i due corpora, ad esempio vi 
sono modelli che sono usati dagli studenti e non dagli scrittori esperti, e viceversa (nel 
caso di could, ad es., troviamo could affect, could cause, could face, could feel, could 
find, could lead e could not comuni tra gli studenti; could explain, could indicate, one 
could use, some/it could well comuni tra gli scrittori esperti). 
Per quanto riguarda la terza domanda di ricerca, possiamo rispondere che, in 
genere, questi studenti hanno poche difficoltà nel padroneggiare gli hedges e i boosters, 
sebbene a volte questi studenti hanno commesso errori nell‟uso di questi espedienti 
epistemici (anche se l‟uso di *a clearly rappresenta più una svista che un errore vero e 
proprio). Ciò è quindi in contrasto con quanto riportato da Hyland e Milton (1997), 
ovvero che le espressioni di dubbio e di certezza sono difficili da padroneggiare  per i 
non parlanti nativi. Inoltre, a mio parere, ci potrebbero essere delle differenze 
interculturali nell‟esprimere dubbio e certezza, ovvero che mentre, per esempio, la 
scrittura accademica tedesca sembra essere più diretta che in inglese (come suggerito da 
Hyland 2000), gli studenti italiani generalmente tendono ad essere più cauti. Può darsi 
anche che, essendo studenti universitari al loro terzo anno di studi, essi siano più 
consapevoli delle regole riguardanti la scrittura accademica, compreso l‟uso degli 
hedges e dei boosters. Ovviamente, ulteriori ricerche sarebbero necessarie per 
confermare queste ipotesi. 
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Il capitolo terzo termina con delle implicazioni sull‟insegnamento della 
scrittura accademica collegate agli hedges e ai boosters. La prima è più un dato di fatto 
che un‟implicazione, ovvero si collega al fatto che ho avuto difficoltà a trovare testi 
accademici che spiegassero come usare questi espedienti epistemici e, vista la loro 
importanza, mi auguro che, in futuro, aumenti il numero di testi che parlino di questi 
argomenti, e che anche gli insegnanti presentino questi argomenti, magari con l‟ausilio 
dei suddetti testi, quando introducono la scrittura accademica ai discenti. La seconda 
implicazione è che, a mio parere, sebbene gli hedges siano importanti (e lo dimostra, tra 
l‟altro, l‟alto numero di articoli accademici che si soffermano sul loro uso, che sono in 
numero superiore a quello degli articoli sui boosters), un loro sovra utilizzo potrebbe 
essere deleterio dato che darebbe l‟idea che chi scrive non è sicuro di nulla e che, 
quindi, probabilmente non possiede dati affidabili o vuole evitare qualsiasi 
responsabilità riguardo quanto afferma. Tutto ciò nuocerebbe gravemente 
all‟argomentazione di chi scrive. Per questo motivo credo che gli insegnanti, quando 
presentano la scrittura accademica, dovrebbero soffermarsi su entrambi gli espedienti 
epistemici e dedicar loro ugual tempo. 
La tesi si conclude con un capitolo conclusivo che riassume la discussione dei 
vari capitoli, ripresenta gli obiettivi della tesi e fornisce implicazioni per la ricerca e la 
pratica. 
 
